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CRITICAL CARE RESEARCH AND ]INFORMED
CONSENT
RICHARD S. SAVER*

The doctrine of informed consent severely limits the ability of
medical researchers to develop, evaluate, and refine
investigationaltechnologiesfor the treatment of patients suffering
from heart attacks, strokes, and other "critical care" conditions.
In this Article, Mr. Saver examines the current doctrine of
informed consent as applied to critical care research and its
various deficiencies. In addition, he analyzes recent reforms
proposed by the Food and Drug Administration, which are
intended to remove certain obstacles to critical care research
posed by informed consent. While the proposed reforms address
several of the current deficiencies, he asserts that they lack the
breadth and scope necessary to advance the progress of critical
care research in an ethical and sensible manner. Mr. Saver
proposes several complementary and alternative reforms that
would better accomodate the interests of all affected parties: the
patients, theirfamilies, the researchers,and the generalpublic.
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INTRODUCTION

Approximately 350,000 people suffer sudden heart attacks in the
United States each year. Most die. Bystanders resuscitate only a
small percentage of persons experiencing cardiac arrest.1 Of those
who live long enough to be admitted to a hospital, less than twenty1. See Don Colburn, CPR From Bystanders Often Not Done Right, WASH. POST,
Jan. 2, 1996 (Health Insert), at 5. When the cardiac arrest occurs outside the hospital,
only about 20-30% of victims survive. See SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE 41
(1994). The likelihood of survival drops to near zero for patients who have not responded
to cardiopulmonary resuscitation by the time of arrival at the hospital. See id.

1996]

INFORMED CONSENT

five percent survive to leave. Among this group, many are often irreversibly impaired by brain damage, organ malfunctions, and other
devastating complications.2
Given these grim statistics, researchers have questioned whether
standard cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) techniques can be
improved in terms of better survival rates or quality of life factors for
post-cardiac arrest victims. Because current CPR practices were developed on a mostly theoretical basis, few controlled studies of CPR3
techniques or other cardiac arrest treatments have been conducted.
Thus, much of what has become standard medical therapy for use in
resuscitative clinical care has not been sufficiently evaluated by investigational trials that demonstrate safety or effectiveness. Research in
this area has been impeded by the near impossibility of satisfying legal standards for informed consent. Until recent regulatory reforms,
the applicable law, consisting primarily of federal regulations governing human subjects research, required that prospective informed
consent be obtained from subjects before the administration of experimental therapies, with few available exceptions. For example,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recently halted clinical
trials of the "Cardiopump" active compression-decompression cardiopulmonary resuscitation device,
a plunger-like mechanism
developed for the administration of new CPR techniques. FDA
stopped the Cardiopump trials in part because subjects were unable
to provide prospective consent to participate in the -research.4
Obtaining the prospective informed consent fr.om a patient under circumstances such as cardiac arrest is impossible. The patient is
unable to communicate and/or lacks decisional capacity, but the experimental therapy must be applied before the patient stabilizes and
regains the capability of providing legally effective consent. This Article refers to such situations as "critical care." In critical care
settings, the patient's decisional or communicational incapacity may
be temporary or permanent.5 Typical conditions that impair the criti2. See Waiver of Informed Consent. A Critical Issue for Improving Treatment of
Emergent Medical Conditions, North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology
Government Relations Committee Position Statement, Testimony presented at
FDAINIH Public Forum (1995) [hereinafter FDA/NIHPublic Forum Testimony]; see also

NULAND, supra note 1, at 40 (explaining that when the brain is starved of oxygen during a
heart attack for longer than two to four minutes, brain damage becomes irreversible).
3. See FDA/NIH PublicForum Testimony, supranote 2.
4. See Carin M. Olson & Drummond Rennie, Plungers and Polemics: Active Compression-DecompressionCPR and FederalPolicy, 273 JAMA 1299, 1299 (1995).

5. What constitutes decisional incapacity is beyond the scope of this Article. In
many critical care situations, patients are completely unconscious or unable to communi-
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cal care patient include stroke, coma, seizure, cardiac arrest, senility,
depression of mental faculties, drug overdose, head trauma, poisoning, hemorrhagic shock, acute asthma attacks, and pulmonary
embolism. 6 The state of incapacity may be slowly progressive, as with
the cognitive impairments arising from dementia or Alzheimer's disease,7 or sudden and severe, such as can occur with head trauma or
the onset of a coma. Satisfying the informed consent requirements
proves problematic even with conscious critical care patients because
they experience extreme duress and often cannot provide legally effective consent. Indeed, critical care patients able to respond to
questions about research participation often later do not remember
having consented to become subjects.'
The legal difficulties and controversy surrounding the Cardiopump trials demonstrate a fundamental problem common to critical
care research. Although researchers have developed investigational
technologies and techniques that can be applied to patients in critical
care situations, 9 many such therapies require rapid application to be
effective' ° and satisfying the informed consent requirement presents a
cate. However, questions of patient competence and decisional capacity can be more
difficult to judge, for example, in patients with certain neurological problems. See generally Morris Freedman et al., Assessment of Competency: The Role of Neurobehavioral

Deficits, 115

ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

203 (1991) (proposing guidelines for assessing

competency in patients with cognitive deficits due to neurological disorders); Edmund G.
Howe et al., Medical Determination (and Preservation)of Decision-Making Capacity, 19
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 27 (1991) (contending that patients suffering from depression may not be equipped to make competent medical decisions).
6. See Charles R McCarthy, To Be or Not to Be: Waiving Informed Consent in
Emergency Research, 5 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 155, 155 (1995); Paul B. Solnick, Proxy
Consentfor IncompetentNon-Terminally IllAdult Patients,6 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 2 (1985).
7. See Dallas M. High, Research with Alzheimer's Disease Subjects: Informed Consent and Proxy Decision Making, 40 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc. 950, 950 (1992) (noting that
persons afflicted with Alzheimer's disease are, by definition, on a path of declining capacity to consent to research); Dale L. Moore, An IRB Member's Perspectiveon Access to
Innovative Therapy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 559,578 (1994).
8. See Researchers Seeking More Freedom for ER Experiments, PHYSICIANS FIN.
NEws 16 (indicating that in a trial of heart-attack patients who went through the consent
process only 48% of patients even remembered signing the consent form and only half
remembered receiving the experimental therapy).
9. See William H. Spivey et al., Informed Consentfor Biomedical Research in Acute
CareMedicine, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1251, 1251 (1991).
10. See Carin M. Olson, The Letter or the Spirit Consent for Research in CPR, 271
JAMA 1445, 1445 (1994). For example, irreversible organ damage may occur before the
patient can be expected to regain consciousness. See Norman S. Abramson et al., Deferred Consent A New Approach for Resuscitation Research on Comatose Patients,255
JAMA 2466, 2467 (1986). Similarly, research into the benefits of thrombolytic therapy
for heart attack victims shows that the timing of drug administration is crucial. See Pamela S. Grim et al., Informed Consent in Emergency Research." PrehospitalThrombolytic
Therapy for Acute MyocardialInfarction, 262 JAMA 252, 254 (1989); see also National
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significant obstacle to clinical investigations." Apart from the Cardiopump trials, several other experimental investigations have
grounded to a halt because of liability concerns related to waiving
informed consent. 2 This occurs at a time of renewed concern about
the ethical conduct of medical experimentation generally" and, as a
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Tissue PlasminogenActivator for Acute
Ischemic Stroke, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1581, 1581 (1995) (asserting that treatment of
stroke with intravenous recombinant tissue plasminogen activator improves clinical outcomes if administered within three hours of onset of ischemic stroke).
11. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086,49,090
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21, 1995). At one academic
medical center, a protocol for a randomized clinical trial of high dose versus standard
dose epinephrine in cardiac arrest failed to receive necessary approvals, even though
clinicians at the medical center were split on the merits and some used the high dose
treatment as conventional therapy while others did not. See id. The research was not
approved due to informed consent obstacles, with the result that no data was available
from a controlled clinical trial to test which dosage schedule of the drug was truly more
effective. See id.; see also Problems in Securing Informed Consent of Subjects in Experimental Trials of Unapproved Drugs and Devices: Hearings Before the Subcomm on
Regulation, Bus. Opportunities, and Tech. of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 103rd
Cong., 14-17, 111-16 (1994) (testimony of Jeffrey Koepsell, President, Cardiologic Systems, Inc.) [hereinafter Problems in Securing Informed Consent] (describing how
obtaining prospective informed consent in a trial of a vest-CPR system, by seeking out
potential cardiac arrest victims, would require approaching approximately 260,000 patients to enroll 400 at a cost of $1A million).
12. For example, a sponsor stopped a study at the University of Nebraska Medical
Center involving closed head injury victims given an experimental drug to help control
cerebrovascular damage. The sponsor reevaluated its position and stated that the trial
could continue only with the prospective informed consent of subjects. This compromised
the study's statistically valid sample and delayed enrollment, resulting in failure to evaluate the test drug under optimal conditions of rapid application. See Ernest D. Prentice et
al., IRB Review of a Phase II Randomized Clinical Trial Involving Incompetent Patients
Suffering from Severe ClosedHead Injury, IRB, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 1.
Dr. John Barrett, director of Cook County Hospital's trauma unit, proposed a new
treatment to the hospital's research review committee involving administration of experimental treatment to unconscious, head-injury patients in the emergency room. The
committee found the study promising but, concluding that the hospital would be at risk
for potential liability, it postponed the investigation. See Lynne Markek, Ethical Dilemma
in the ER Experiment on Patients?,CH. TRIB., May 23,1994, at 1.
More recently, researchers at the University of Texas Health Sciences Center in
Houston encountered problems completing an investigation involving use of cooling
blankets to induce hypothermia in severe head injury patients. See McCarthy, supra note
6, at 156. The hypothermia study has been allowed to proceed without meeting prospective informed consent requirements only after the Department of Health and Human
Services granted a special waiver. See Action Related to Emergency Research Activity,
60 Fed. Reg. 38,353 (1995).
13. Researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles recently revealed that
they had enrolled schizophrenic patients in a clinical trial studying the effects of lowering
doses of medication, with the reasonable belief that this could lead to disruptive psychiatric episodes, without having obtained full informed consent of the patients or their
representatives. At Rhode Island Hospital, researchers denied food to drunken patients
who were temporarily, but severely, impaired by the effects of alcohol, in an effort to
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result, increased sensitivity towards the need for obtaining subjects'
fully informed consent.
Numerous commentators criticize the informed consent doctrine
as elevating ritual and form over substance because it requires procedures which do not advance the patient's understanding, are easily
subject to manipulation, and impose burdensome information exchange costs. 4 Thus, there have been calls to change the informed
consent standards and expressly require that investigators engage in
frank and extended discussions with patients about the experimental
nature of the proposed activity in order to ensure that subjects are
not coerced or misled.' But in critical care situations, there simply p
no time for an extended dialogue between investigator and subject
about the nature of the experiment. In such settings, it is impossible
to comply even with the minimum legal standards already criticized
as deficient and inadequate.
The legal requirement for informed consent, although historically rooted in the protections against bodily injury under the battery
doctrine, derives continued support from the ethical and commonlaw principle that patients should be respected as persons capable
and entitled to control their own medical care decisions. If patients
are to be treated as autonomous agents, they must be provided material information relating to the risks and benefits of a proposed
medical treatment and its alternatives in order to effectively decide
study blood glucose levels in alcoholics. See Jim Montague, BalancingCaution and Courage: Physicians and Regulators Weigh Informed Consent Issues in Clinical Research,
HosP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 20, 1994, at 50; Problems in Securing Informed Consent, supra note 11, at 4-14.
14. Criticisms of the informed consent doctrine include that it promotes individualistic values at the expense of communitarian values, wastes valuable resources, undermines
trust in the medical profession, and fails to recognize that some patients simply do not
want to be informed. See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979
WIs. L. REv. 413, 415-16 [hereinafter Meisel, Striking a Balance]; see also Alan Meisel,
More on Making Consent Forms More Readable, IRB, Jan. 1982, at 8 (calling informed
consent a "myth" because physicians provide whatever information is necessary to get the
patient to go along with their recommendation); Alan Weisbard, Informed Consent: The
Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REv. 749,751 (1986) (arguing
that the law has transformed the ideal of informed consent into little more than a duty to
warn of medical risks which is not measured by actual informational needs of individual
patients; the entire process has taught physicians more how to practice medicine defensively than to foster the physician-patient relationship). Professor Jay Katz has argued
for a complete overhaul of the current legal framework, contending that the present legal
standards and procedures are too easily subject to manipulation by physician investigators
and do not satisfactorily protect the rights of subjects to individual autonomy, selfdetermination, and bodily integrity. See Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human
Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 9 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 14, at 25.
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whether to participate in the research. Validation of this broad unconsent doctrine "requires that we
derlying principle of the informed
16
decide.
we
before
deliberate
Consequently, nowhere is the gap between legal theory and the
realities of medical practice more evident than in application of the
traditional informed consent doctrine to critical care research. The
reasoned deliberation of the patient contemplated by the informed
consent doctrine is simply not feasible when the patient suffers decisional or communicational incapacity and there is a limited time
window for administering an experimental treatment. Thus, rigid
application of informed consent requirements in critical care settings
severely limits medical researchers' ability to test and study new
therapies, preventing the efficient diffusion of beneficial medical
technologies.
In a significant new regulatory development, the FDA has proposed amendments to its informed consent regulations that would
relax the informed consent requirements in the critical care setting. 7
In response to criticisms of the current obstacles to conducting critical care research, the FDA has proposed to revise its regulations to
allow waiver of informed consent under limited circumstances. 8
Relaxing the informed consent requirement for critical care research
raises difficult issues regarding the physician-patient relationship and
biomedical research. At one end of the spectrum are firmly held be16.

RONALD MUNSON,

INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION:

BASIC ISSUES IN

MEDICAL ETHICS 337 (5th ed. 1996).
17. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086,49,090
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21,1995).
18. In 1993, the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) Office of Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) sent a warning letter to academic medical centers in response to
reports that certain institutions were conducting critical care research using "deferred
consent" procedures, where patients were informed of their enrollment in the clinical
investigation after the fact. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. The warning
letter reiterated the need for researchers to obtain prospective informed consent. See
Letter from Gary Ellis, OPRR Director, to IRB Chairpersons, Informed ConsentLegally Effective and Prospectively Obtained, OPRR REP. No. 93-3 (Aug. 12, 1993)
[hereinafter OPRR Letter]. The medical research community responded in a series of
articles, correspondence, and public meetings demanding reform of the informed consent
rules. Industry representatives testified at a May 23, 1994 hearing of the Subcommittee
on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Technology, of the House Committee on
Small Business. See generally Problems in Securing Informed Consent, supra note 11
(discussing the testimony). In addition, several professional organizations formed the
Coalition of Acute Resuscitation and Critical Care Researchers to address the issue and
in January 1995, the FDA and NIH cosponsored a public forum where the Coalition's
recommendations were discussed and other testimony heard. See Protection of Human
Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,090.
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fiefs about individualism and patient autonomy as well as underlying
concerns for patient safety in light of the egregious medical experiments of previous decades. Countervailing considerations include
the societal benefits gained by systematic testing of medical technologies and the professional commitment, and at times paternalistic
impulse, of physicians to act in their patients' best interests, especially where the patients cannot act for themselves. At bottom, it
seems a terrible choice between forcing patients to become mere experimental objects or protecting these same patients to death.
As explained in further detail below, the FDA has proposed to
strike the balance in favor of increased experimentation. FDA's
proposed rules permit waiver of informed consent where: (i) the
subject is in a life-threatening situation; (ii) available treatments are
unproven or unsatisfactory; (iii) the subject cannot consent because
of the medical condition; (iv) the intervention must be administered
before consent from the patient or a representative is feasible; and
(v) the risk of the intervention is reasonable in light of what is known
about the medical condition, the current therapy, and the proposed
intervention.' 9 Once the FDA rules are issued in final form, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is expected to
harmonize its separate informed consent regulations through
amendment and/or waiver so that both agencies will permit waiver of
consent for critical care research under the same circumstances. °
This Article acknowledges the merit of the FDA's proposed
rules, which attempt to remove unnecessary obstacles to critical care
research while preserving safeguards for patient safety and respect
for individual autonomy, but concludes that the revised regulations
are ultimately inadequate and unsatisfactory. The FDA's proposed
reforms are underinclusive in that they are limited to "lifethreatening" situations, thus leaving in place significant barriers to
research involving rapid application of experimental therapies for
patients who face intractable pain and/or permanent disability but
who are not at risk of imminent death. In addition, the rules are ambiguous and unclear in certain key respects, such as failing to provide
clear guidance as to when available treatments are considered sufficiently unproven or unsatisfactory to warrant application of
experimental therapies to patients without their consent. This lack of
19. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,095-96.
20. See F. William Dommel, Jr., Senior Policy Advisor, Office for Protection From
Research Risk, National Institutes of Health, Oral Remarks at the Conference Concerning Legal Issues Affecting Academic Medical Centers Sponsored by the American
Academy of Healthcare Attorneys in Arlington, Virginia (Jan. 18, 1996).
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clear standards will allow researchers and academic medical institutions too much leeway in neglecting patients' rights and avoiding
consideration of their treatment preferences. Informed consent
should be waived with critical care patients only if the research sponsors follow express procedures to demonstrate that the trial design, in
light of what is known, maximizes likely benefits and minimizes likely
harm. Moreover, the research sponsors should be required to demonstrate that the study can yield generalizable scientific results, so
that, at a minimum, subjects' nonconsensual participation in the experiment has the potential to produce meaningful answers.
In addition, this Article argues that complementary to the reforms in the FDA proposed rules, regulatory and legislative change is
needed to increase use of flexible surrogate consent procedures that
approximate critical care patients' treatment preferences. This would
require broadening and making more readily identifiable the class of
persons who may have legal authorization to consent to research participation for the critical care patient. Researchers should be
permitted to consult a standardized hierarchy of representatives who
may act for the critical care patient and such surrogates should be
directed to make research participation decisions using the substituted judgment standard, approximating what they think the patient
would want. Only if all potential surrogates are unavailable should
the research be allowed to proceed by waiving informed consent.
Although significant problems with surrogate consent are acknowledged, this Article maintains that increased use of readily
available and commonly understood surrogate consent procedures
represents the best practical compromise of competing concerns. Increased use of surrogate consent procedures advances the progress of
critical care trials and yet accommodates to some degree the ethical
and legal principle of respect for autonomy by requiring, wherever
possible, that a surrogate be charged to act in accord with the patient's individual preferences. Also, increased use of surrogate
consent mechanisms provides an additional level of review of the experiment and allows for a more critical examination of the risks and
benefits of the proposed investigation by outside parties.
Part I of this Article reviews the law of informed consent in critical care research and the limitations placed on waiver of consent that
existed before the recent FDA proposals.21 Part II discusses the ethical issues raised by waiving informed consent in critical care research
and analyzes the merits of various alternative approaches apart from
21. See infra notes 25-106 and accompanying text.
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the new FDA rules, such as deferred consent and advance directives,
that have been proposed for dealing with informed consent in the
critical care setting. Part HI reviews in detail the FDA's reform
proposal and argues that the new regulations are underinclusive, unfairly excluding injured critical care patients who do not face
imminent death, and that the FDA has paid insufficient attention to
autonomy concerns in justifying its new rules. 3 This section further
argues that the Agency has failed to ensure that consent will be
waived only when the likely risk/benefit comparison of the standard
treatment and investigational therapy satisfies acceptable levels. Part
IV concludes with recommendations and policy options to complement the FDA proposed reforms, emphasizing increased use of
surrogate consent procedures that approximate critical care patients'
preferences. 24 Also strongly recommended is that critical care trials
depending on waiver of consent employ expert surrogate consent
procedures that demonstrate the acceptability of an investigation to
medical experts who are not affiliated with the principal researchers.
I. INFORMED CONSENT IN CRITICAL CARE RESEARCH: THE LEGAL
BACKGROUND
To appreciate the problems the FDA has tried to address in its
new rules, it is important to understand the nature and extent of the
previous legal limitations affecting critical care research. This section
summarizes and reviews the applicable law on informed consent and
medical experimentation before the proposed FDA reforms. Principally, federal regulations govern the conduct of research involving
human subjects. However, research in the critical care setting also
implicates the common law, statutory, and constitutional rights of
competent adult patients to accept or refuse proffered medical care.
Pending final adoption of the new reforms proposed by the FDA, the
applicable law allows research without the patient's prospective consent only under extremely narrow circumstances.
In many
jurisdictions, the law remains unclear as to who besides the patient
may consent for participation in research. This uncertainty in the legal rules contributes to present problems.
A. Medical ExperimentationRegulations
As a result of increasing public outrage at the discovery of egre22. See infra notes 107-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 176-206 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 207-40 and accompanying text.
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gious violations of patient fights in the name of medical "research," '
Congress in 1974 enacted the National Research Act (NRA),26 which
authorized the creation of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the
Commission). The Commission issued the influential Belmont Report, a set of ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of
human subjects in research.27 Many of the regulatory recommendations of the Belmont Report were implemented by the federal
agencies. In 1981 both the FDA and HHS relied upon the recommendations when revising their regulations concerning the protection
of human subjects.
The FDA and HHS regulations have broad application, affecting
most biomedical research activities conducted in the United States.
Research subject to the regulations needs to be submitted to Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) for approval, which must ensure that
clinical studies adhere to the informed consent requirements.2 The
FDA regulations apply to all clinical investigations regulated by the
Agency, as well as clinical investigations that support applications for
research
or marketing
permits
for products
regulated
by in
thewhole
FDA.or29
HHS requires
IRB review
of research
it conducts,
funded
25. See, e.g., In re Hyman, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1964) (live cancer cells were injected
into elderly patients at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn without the patients' knowledge or consent). In the federally sponsored Tuskegee Syphilis Study, poor
African-American men suffering from syphilis were deliberately left untreated as part of
a study investigating the natural history of the disease. The patients were not aware that
they were in the study and several were not even told that they had syphilis. See generally
JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 1993).
26. See National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300aaa-13 (1994)).
27. See National Commissionfor the Protectionof Human Subjects of Biomedical and
BehavioralResearch, The Belmont Report: EthicalPrinciples and Guidelinesfor the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0012, Appendix
Volume I, DHEW Publication No. (OS)78-0013, Appendix Volume II, DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0014 (1978) [hereinafter Belmont Report].
28. IRBs are committees established in accord with the federal regulations to monitor and approve applications for individual investigations at different research
institutions. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102(g); 46.103(b)(4), (5); 46.108(a). IRB membership is
required by the regulations to include persons of different backgrounds and professions,
in an attempt to reflect the prevailing values of the community. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107
(1995).
29. Before 1981, clinical research conducted in private physicians' offices was generally exempted from the IRB review requirement. The 1981 revision of FDA's regulations
requires all research submitted to the agency to be reviewed by an IRB. Noninstitutional
Review Boards have been formed to review research conducted outside research institutions. These boards function like IRBs and review proposals from outside researchers for
a fee. See Angela Holder, Regulation of Human Subjects Research, in TREATISE ON
HEALTH CARE LAW § 23.02[2], at 23-12 (Michael MacDonald et al. eds., 1995).
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in part by an HHS grant, cooperative grant, or fellowship, or subject
to regulation by a federal agency.30 The HHS regulations are implemented under the direction of the Office for Protection from
Research Risks (OPRR) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
Many biomedical research institutions and academic medical centers
file general assurances with OPRR, 31 and thus require IRB review of
all research done on their premises, even if not federally funded. In
addition, most private foundations and other research funding agencies require compliance with federal standards for any research
funded by them because of governing ethical policies, as well as the
desire to limit potential liability.32
Pending promulgation of final rules adopting the FDA proposed
reforms, the federal regulations generally require that the "legally
effective informed consent" of the subject be obtained before administration of the experimental therapy. Investigators can seek
consent of potential subjects only under circumstances that provide
the prospective subject "sufficient opportunity to consider whether or
not to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence."' 4 Clearly, the time demands and inherently stressful
circumstances associated with critical care research are not contemplated.
The regulations provide that, in place of the subject, an investigator may seek and obtain consent from the patient's "legally
authorized representative. ' 35 But it is not at all clear how to identify
this potential surrogate. The regulations simply define a patient's
legally authorized representative in circular fashion to mean "an individual or judicial or other body authorized under applicable law to
consent on behalf of a prospective subject to the subject's participation in the procedure(s) involved in the research., 36 Because federal
law ultimately does not answer this question, investigators must look
to state law to determine who is the subject's authorized representative.37 Unfortunately, the law is unsettled in many jurisdictions and

30. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1995).

31. See id.
at § 46.103.
32. See Holder, supra note 29, § 23.02[1], at 23-10; Moore, supra note 7, at 564; A.
John Popp & Dale L. Moore, Institutional Review Board Evaluation of Neuroscience
ProtocolsInvolving Human Subjects, 41 SURGICAL NEUROLOGY 162,163 (1994).
33. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1995).
34. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
35. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
36. 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(m); 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c).
37. See Moore, supra note 7, at 580.
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often a clear answer is not readily available. Despite the custom of
hospitals and emergency room physicians to rely on next-of-kin consent in treating patients in critical care situations, relatives in several
jurisdictions are not necessarily legally authorized to make health
care decisions for a patient unless a durable power of attorney for
health care has been executed or a guardianship proceeding has concluded.38 In many states, the applicable laws and regulations are
vague and confusing and fail to provide clear guidance as to who, beside the patient or court-appointed guardian, may consent.
The previous FDA regulations diverge somewhat from the HHS
regulations in certain critical respects. In particular, these regulations
establish a different set of criteria for waiving the informed consent
requirement than do the HHS rules.
1. HHS Waiver Requirements
Pending reform of its regulations to harmonize with the new
FDA rules, HHS permits waiver of informed consent provided that:
(1) [t]he research involves no more than minimal risk to the
subjects; (2) [t]he waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; (3) [t]he research
could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or
alteration; and (4) [w]henever appropriate, the subjects will
be provided with additional pertinent information after participation.'o
The principal problem in applying the HHS standards to critical
care research protocols is satisfying the criterion that the research
involve no more than "minimal risk."' ' The HHS regulations define
"minimal risk" as when "the probability and magnitude of harm or
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or

38. See, e.g., Prentice et al., supra note 12, at 3 (describing the approval of a study at
the University of Nebraska Medical Center involving consent of next-of-kin for enroll-

ment of closed head injury patients in an experimental trial despite the fact that, at the
time, Nebraska law expressly gave only court appointed guardians and individuals named
in durable powers of attorney authority to make health care decisions for incompetent
persons).

39. See, e.g., 28 PA. CODE. § 553.12(b)(10) (1995) (outlining Pennsylvania patient
"bill of rights" regulation for licensed ambulatory surgery facilities and stating that
"responsible person[s]" may give informed consent for participation in a research program for a patient unable to do so, but failing to indicate how to identify such persons).
40. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (1995).

41. Id. § 46.116(a)(1).
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tests."42 In most cases, the experimental therapy under investigation
will not be able to meet this narrow definition. Arguably, a patient
with a life-threatening illness such as AIDS, for which no standard
therapy is recognized as ultimately effective, faces no more than
"minimal risk" in receiving an experimental therapy because the
conventional treatment itself carries certain risk and only limited
benefit. However, in a typical clinical investigation the comparative
risk of the treatments-the degree to which the experimental therapy
may pose more dangers than the standard therapy-is unknown,
which explains precisely why the experiment is being undertaken in
the first place.43 Certainly, most researchers expect that the investigational treatment will not put the patient at a disproportionate risk.
Despite an investigator's good faith belief in the efficacy of the experimental therapy, the results of clinical investigations often prove
otherwise. 44
Others contend that a researcher can satisfy the "minimal risk"
criterion so long as at the start of the investigation, the researcher has
no reason to believe that patients with the standard treatment will
fare better and that no known superior treatment is withheld. 45 However, this interpretation ignores the plain language of the regulation,
which requires that the risk anticipated be no more than that encountered in ordinary life. Because of the uncertainties inherent in
biomedical research, providing any assurances that this minimal risk
threshold will not be crossed proves difficult.4 6 This is especially true
42. Id. § 46.102(i).
43. See Olson, supra note 10, at 1446.
44. Randomized trials have discredited numerous technologies as ineffective, such as
internal mammary artery ligation, long after their use has become widespread. See Byron
W. Brown, Jr., Statistical Controversies in the Design of Clinical Trials-Some Personal
Views, 1 CONTROLLED CLiNICAL TRIALS 13, 15 (1980). Other technologies supported by

anecdotal observations of clinicians, such as corticosteroids for chronic hepatitis B and
cytosine arabinoside for disseminated herpes zoster, not only were proven ineffective, but
were shown to be more harmful than a placebo when tested under controlled studies. See
Douglas D. Richman, Public Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Raises Yet
Another Conflict Between Freedom of the Individual and Welfare of the Individual and
Public, 159 J. INFEcTIOUS DISEASES 412,413 (1989); see also Lawrence K. Altman, Fatal
Drug Trial Raises Questions About "Informed Consent," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at C3
(stating that experimental hepatitis B drug, Fialuridine, caused unexpected deaths among
trial participants, even though animal experiments and monitoring tests did not suggest
the severe dangers).
45. See Robert J. Levine, Research in Emergency Situations: The Role of Deferred
Consent, 273 JAMA 1300, 1301-02 (1995).

46. But see McCarthy, supra note 6, at 158-59 (arguing that regulatory history of the
development of the minimal risk concept evidences intent that the regulations be interpreted in a flexible manner in light of the risks ordinarily encountered by research
subjects, not the risks ordinarily encountered by healthy persons).
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in many critical care circumstances where the investigational therapy
may be studied under an "add-on" design, in which every patient receives the standard treatment in addition to the treatment being
compared. Little is known about the interaction of different therapies and techniques under critical care conditions. In addition, the
minimal risk standard cannot be applied consistently to a critically ill
or injured patient, who already experiences risks beyond the ordinary.4 7 A researcher's conclusion that the patient faces a desperate
situation in which the unknown experimental therapy offers at least
the same promise of benefit as the unsatisfactory standard treatment
fails to provide sufficient justification for proceeding with the research. A fundamental purpose of the informed consent requirement
is to guard against the dangers of a researcher's misguided expectations and overreaching paternalism.48
An alternative interpretation of the critical concept of minimal
risk suggests that the analysis should focus on the circumstances of
the individual patient, who because of the illness is already facing
greater than common danger, and thus compare the differential risk
between the standard and experimental therapy. Under this approach, the minimal risk criterion is satisfied if the difference is
minimal between the dangers presented by the standard accepted
therapy and the risk of an undesirable outcome with the experimental therapy.49 However, this interpretation also ignores the clear
regulatory language that the risk presented be no more than that
"ordinarily encountered in daily life." Moreover, this interpretation
assumes in circular fashion that the researcher can ensure, in advance, that the experimental therapy does not produce unaccepted
risk, notwithstanding the fact that the therapy remains investigational.
The emphasis on differential risk downplays the
investigational nature of the activity, conveniently glossing over the
fact that one of the critical unknown variables is how much risk is
posed by application of the experimental therapy to the critical care
condition.

47. See Coalition Conference of Acute Resuscitation and Critical Care Researchers,
Informed Consent in Emergency Research, 273 JAMA 1283,1285 (1995).
48. See, e.g., AM. Capron, Protectionof Research Subjects: Do Special Rules Apply
in Epidemiology?, 19 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 184, 186-87 (1991); infra notes 12343

and accompanying text (discussing the role of patient autonomy in medical decisionmaking).
49. See, e.g., Abramson et al., supra note 10, at 2468.
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2. Previous FDA Waiver Requirements
Before the additional circumstances provided for under the
FDA's recent proposed regulatory changes, the FDA allowed waiver
of informed consent only when each of the following conditions were
met:
(1) The human subject [was] confronted by a lifethreatening situation necessitating the use of the test article.
(2) Informed consent [could not] be obtained from the
subject because of an inability to communicate with, or obtain legally effective consent from, the subject.
(3) Time [was] not sufficient to obtain consent from the
subject's legal representative.
(4) There [was] available no alternative method of approved or generally recognized therapy that provid[ed] an
equal or greater likelihood of saving the life of the subject."
These criteria contemplate waiver of informed consent only in
life-threatening situations and even then under limited circumstances.
For example, if the research involves randomization of patients between the experimental therapy and a placebo, it would be difficult to
satisfy the first criterion, because use of a placebo is not
"necessitated" by the subject's acute care condition.1
The principal obstacle to waiving informed consent under these
narrow standards is satisfying the fourth criterion that no existing
therapies provide an equal or greater chance of saving the patient's
life. Such a requirement generally prevents waiver for an experiment
comparing investigational therapy to a standard therapy with a recognized effectiveness, even if the standard therapy is considered to
offer only modest benefits. Because an experimental therapy's effectiveness will be unknown, it will be virtually impossible to provide
assurances that the experimental therapy provides the greater likelihood of saving the patient's life. 2 The subjects will of course benefit
if the experimental therapy works as planned, but participation could
expose subjects to grave unknown risks, evidencing the importance of
obtaining their informed consent prospectively.
In addition, investigators waiving informed consent under these

50. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (1996).

51. However, FDA regulations arguably permit a study which compares the standard
treatment plus a placebo to the standard treatment plus the experimental article, because
in this situation, administration of the placebo would not constitute nontreatment. See
Prentice et al., supra note 12, at 4.

52. See Olson, supranote 10, at 1446.
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provisions must submit documentation to the IRB within five days
after administration of the investigational therapy.53 The documentation requirement suggests that waiver is expected to occur on a caseby-case basis in emergency circumstances. Accordingly, these provisions provide dubious authorization for research protocols
involving a blanket waiver of informed consent for all potential subjects.
B. Statutory and Common Law
1. Informed Consent for Research
Apart from the federal regulations, the common law imposes
certain duties and obligations on participants in clinical research.
Scant case law exists concerning medical experimentation. Indeed,
the early reported cases did not directly address the experimental aspects of therapeutic research and instead analyzed such situations as
typical malpractice cases, with the experimental therapy considered
evidence that a practitioner had deviated from standard practice.
Courts generally assumed that such therapy was careless or reckless,
and physicians could be held strictly liable for any damages resulting
to the patient.
Nevertheless, researchers today generally may apply experimental therapy without risk of common-law liability if they first obtain
the subject's informed consent. The common-law duty for obtaining
informed consent, which mirrors the informed consent requirements
of the federal regulations, follows from the recognition of the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary relationship. According to the
basic laws of agency, a fiduciary must not only justify the reasonableness of a transaction, but also disclose it and seek the agreement of
the principal-client. 56 As a fiduciary to the patient, the physician
owes a certain deference to the patient's interests, which means that
the physician must ascertain what the patient's preferences are in
light of the risks presented by the proposed treatment and available
53. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(c) (1996).
54. See Olson, supra note 10, at 1446. Indeed, because of the narrow case-by-case

limitations, federal officials contrasted the HHS regulations as allowing waiver of informed consent while the FDA regulations did not. See Joan P. Porter, Development of a
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 623, 628 (1990).

55. See generally Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentationand the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 63, 71-74 (1993) (collecting cases and discussing history).

56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 381,383 (1994).
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alternatives. 7 Although the case law has not specifically addressed
the question, the medical researcher likely has a fiduciary relationship to the subject just as the doctor has to his or her patient.
Moreover, the common law recognizes a person's right of "selfdetermination" to make medical decisions about his or her body. 9
The right to self-determination includes the right to make decisions
regarding participation in medical research. To protect this right, the
subject's informed consent must be obtained before the application
of experimental treatment.O
57. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
58. See Holder, supra note 29, § 23.03[l], at 23-22. In many cases, the physician is
also the researcher and the fiduciary relationship can be implied from the investigator's
role as physician. Whether biomedical researchers who have not established a therapeutic relationship with their subjects are fiduciaries is less clear. See Angela R. Holder, Do
Researchers and Subjects Have a FiduciaryRelationship?, IRB, Jan. 1982, at 6 (suggesting
that there is such a relationship).
59. The seminal case articulating this concept of patient autonomy is Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other grounds by
Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), where Judge Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault .... " Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93; See also Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill.
App. 161, 166 (1905) (holding that a patient has the right to the "inviolability of his person"), affid, 79 N.E.2d 562 (Il. 1906).
60. Although the physician-patient relationship may be contractual in nature, tort law
supplies the background legal rules that limit and regulate a physician's professional
authority. Thus, the patient-subject's interest in autonomy and self-determination is
analyzed mainly under tort doctrines. The notion of bodily integrity reflected in the
common-law protections against battery is embodied in the requirement that a patient's
informed consent must be obtained before the initiation of medical treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990).
However, the battery doctrine does not apply to many aspects of the physicianpatient relationship because not every malpractice claim can be characterized as a nonconsensual touching. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972) (distinguishing
between claims constituting a battery and those sounding in negligence); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 225-26 (1985); Richard P. Dooling, Comment, Damage Actions for Nonconsensual Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 30 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 895, 900-01 (1986).
Accordingly, today the informed consent requirement is more commonly analyzed under
the tort rubric of negligence. A physician is held to have a duty to provide sufficient information to a patient so that he or she may make an informed medical choice. The
various jurisdictions follow two general standards for the extent of disclosure required to
make a patient's consent a truly informed one. See Goldner, supra note 55, at 76-77. The
majority rule is that a physician must disclose what a reasonable practitioner, practicing
according to community standards, would disclose under the same circumstances. See id.
Alternatively, slightly less than half of jurisdictions determine the scope of disclosure by
what the reasonable patient would want to know under the circumstances in order to
make an informed choice about medical treatment. See id. In the latter jurisdictions, the
physician's duty to seek the patient's informed consent is based less on the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship and more on the patient's right to self-
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Accordingly, most commentators agree that the informed consent requirements for research are essentially the same as the
informed consent requirements for standard medical practice." Indeed, the informed consent doctrine may apply more rigorously in
the research setting. 62 As part of the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship, the physician is presumed to act in the best
interests of the individual patient. However, clinical protocols demand that the investigator follow systematic procedures to develop
generalizable knowledge, including when to initiate and stop therapy,
that may end up benefiting future patients more than the immediate
determination. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786 ("[T]he patient's right of selfdecision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal."). The informed consent provisions
of the federal regulations follow the reasonable patient standard for determining the
scope of disclosure. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (1996); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (1995).
61. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 14, at 13-14 & n.21 (noting the only significant distinction is that in therapy settings, physicians may still invoke the "therapeutic exception" to
enable the physician to withhold certain information that is likely to cause psychological
harm to the patient).
62. See Nancy M. King, Consent to Treatment, in HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW,
§§ 7, 7.13 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991); Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed
Consentin Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REv. 67, 93-94 (1986); Nancy M. King & Gail Henderson,
Treatments of Last Resort: Informed Consent and the Diffusion of New Technology, 42
MERCER L. REv. 1007, 1044 (1991); see also Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 649,
321 S.E.2d 240, 254 (1984) (holding that a health care provider offering an experimental
procedure has a duty to inform a patient of the uncertainty regarding risk associated with
experimental procedures as well as the known or most likely projected risks); Clemens v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 87 Cal. Rptr. 108, 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (instructing the
jury that a physician seeking consent to a new or experimental procedure should inform
the patient that it is new or experimental when seeking consent). In Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, [1965] D.L.R.2d 436, one of the few reported experimentation cases,
the plaintiff volunteered to participate in a study involving circulatory responses under
anesthesia. See id. at 437-39. The physician neither disclosed several of the risks associated with the procedure, nor that the new drug was an anesthetic. See id. at 444. The
court stated that "the duty imposed upon those engaged in medical research... is at least
as great as, if not greater than, the duty owed by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his
patient." Id. at 443-44. In Schwartz v. Boston Hospital for Women, 422 F. Supp. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), the plaintiff claimed that hospital physicians improperly performed a
scraping of her uterus after her Caesarean section delivery as part of an experiment without her consent. See id. at 54. The district court denied the hospital's motion for
summary judgment, stating that "if the [procedure] was performed in the aid of [a] study
rather than for reasons personal to Mrs. Schwartz, and if she did not consent to its performance and it caused her injury, the hospital could be found liable." Id. at 56.
Nevertheless, despite the differences between research and regular medical practice,
some question remains as to whether the research subject should be informed to the same
degree as the individual patient. See, e.g., Thurstan B. Brewen, Consent to Randomized
Treatmen 2 LANCET 919, 921 (1982) (characterizing as "illogical" the "idea that the
mere fact of randomization [of treatment in a clinical trial] always requires special informed consent"). The subject, in volunteering for an experiment, recognizes that a
scientific investigation lurks in the background and cannot reasonably expect the investigator to act like his family doctor. See id.
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subjects. 6' Because research involves activities beyond the expected
scope of the normal physician-patient relationship, the informed consent doctrine may require that more detailed information be
disclosed about expected risks and alternative therapies in the experimentation context.64 In addition, deference to medical expertise
is less appropriate in the research setting, where many more variables
remain unknown. Finally, informed consent standards may be more
rigorous for investigational therapy because the researcher and sub-

ject have conflicting interests. The duty to maintain the scientific
integrity of the study will necessarily limit an investigator's flexibility
in tailoring treatments to the individual patient's specific needs. 65
The distinction between research and standard therapy may be
more useful in theory than in practical application. Increasingly, the
difference is becoming blurred, making it all the more confusing for
physician-investigators and patient-subjects to understand their re63. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 10
(2d ed. 1986).
64. See John Luce, EthicalPrinciplesin Clinical Care,263 JAMA 696, 697 (1990). In
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), the wellpublicized patented cell-line case, the Supreme Court of California recognized that research activities can affect the scope of disclosure required to obtain informed consent.
See id at 485. Moore had developed hairy cell leukemia and was treated by physicians at
UCLA Medical Center. See id at 480. The physicians applied the standard therapy and
removed his spleen. See id at 481. The treating physicians then used biological products
extracted from Moore to develop a cell line capable of producing commercially valuable
proteins. See id at 481. Moore sued the physicians and UCLA Medical Center, seeking
in part to recover a proprietary interest in products produced from his cells and the cell
line. See id at 487. Although the case is most often remembered for the court's holding
that the cell line and protein products derived from Moore's spleen were not the patient's
personal property, see id. at 492, the court also held that Moore's treating physician failed
to obtain effective informed consent. See id. at 485. The court reasoned that "a physician
who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his
fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose personal interests
unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
65. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 68-69, 88-92. The authors identify the
following reasons for heightened informed consent requirements in the experimental
setting: (1) because the risks are not known in advance, only the subject can decide to
undergo them; (2) deferral to medical expertise is inappropriate in the research setting;
(3) the research subject may be unlikely to benefit directly from the research and cannot
be presumed to consent to it; (4) the researcher and subject often have conflicting interests; (5) conscripting human subjects without their consent deprives their acts of moral
meaning; (6) the researcher and the subject have "conflicts of value;" and (7) the researcher has a fiduciary relationship with the subject. See id. at 68-69, 92-107. The
authors recognize that "conflicts of interest" between researcher and subject may not be
stark and crystallized. Thus, they use the term "conflict of value" to describe the situation where, although both parties' interests may not be opposed, they may still have
different ideas about the purposes and goals of the research. See id. at 100-01.

1996]

INFORMED CONSENT

spective rights, obligations, and duties when "innovative" therapies
are attempted during critical care situations. Medical practice often
encompasses both research and therapeutic aspects. ' However, significant differences remain.
In therapeutic medical practice,
individualized adjustments in treatment are more likely to occur as
the physician attempts to address the distinct medical circumstances
of the particular patient, including conditions not under investigation.
Such innovative or novel therapies administered with the primary
intent of benefitting the immediate patient will not yield much more
than anecdotal evidence. 7 In contrast, clinical research decisions are
made at a more generalizable level in order to test a hypothesis or
develop new knowledge that is statistically significat. What treatment the patient receives is often the result of a predesigned
mechanization, such as randomization, than individual clinical decisions of what is best for the patient. Thus, a patient in an
investigational trial is deprived of the "experimentation ordinarily
done to enhance the well-being of the patient" that is commonly
found in clinical practice.6 This distinction between innovative clinical practice and experimental research, which of course will vary in
degree depending on the structure of the research protocol, is arguably the most compelling reason for requiring heightened informed
consent in the research context.
There have been very few cases involving subjects suing researchers for injuries sustained because of negligent care while
undergoing experimental therapy. Experimental subjects as a group
do not appear to be harmed physically
69 more than patients with similar diseases in therapeutic settings. In most cases, "malresearch"
claims involve allegations that a particular risk that has occurred had
not been explained or that the treatment administered was not part
of the agreed-upon research. 70 Because tort suits for malresearch
66. See Katz, supra note 14, at 8.
67. See Belmont Report. supra note 27, at 2-4.
68. See LEVNE, supra note 63, at 10.
69. The Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, which recently
completed a review of randomly selected, federally-funded research projects, from both
radiation and non-radiation related disciplines, concluded that most studies posed only
minimal risk of harm. See Research Ethics and the Medical Profession: Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, 276 JAMA 403, 408 (1996)
[hereinafter Research Ethics and the Medical Profession]. See generally Phillipe V. Cardon et al., Injuries to Research Subjects, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 650 (1976) (discussing a

study conducted in order to determine the number of research related injuries with the
aim of discovering the feasibility of compensating patients injured during such research).
70. See Holder, supra note 29, § 23.08[1], at 23-99. However, in one malresearch case
involving a professional diver who sustained injuries while participating in studies of

226

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

generally must meet the technical requirements for maintaining a
negligence or battery action, damages are a required element, which
may be difficult to prove in the absence of physical harm. The dearth
of malresearch suits alleging physical harm suggests that the primary
purpose of the informed consent doctrine in the experimentation
context is not so much to safeguard potential subjects from physical
danger as to delineate limits on the physician's professional authority
and to ensure respect for the personal autonomy of patients, regardless of whether they are exposed to physical harm.71 Indeed, an
underlying concern evident in the experimentation cases is that the
investigator, however well-intentioned her reasons, has motivations
that may differ from and may even be contrary to the patient's.
Courts generally have been more receptive to patients' claims regarding improper medical treatment where the circumstances suggest
that the physician's research objectives posed a conflict of interest."
2.State Statutes
Several states have enacted statutes addressing human experimentation.7
Such laws generally prohibit certain classes of
incompetent persons, primarily involuntary patients in state mental
deep-sea diving at Duke University, the court held that in rare circumstances the doctrine
of assumption of risk may apply and bar plaintiffs' recovery. See Whitlock v. Duke Univ.,
637 F. Supp. 1463, 1475 (M.D.N.C. 1986). The case had unique facts in that the subject
knew more about the risks of deep-sea diving than the investigators. See id. at 1465-66.
71. See Research Ethics and the Medical Profession,supra note 69, at 408 (noting that
the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments found that most current
studies pose only minimal harm but that seriously ill patients are often confused about
research activities and may not have realistic views of the likely benefits). Most commentators conclude that protection from physical harm lies at the heart of the informed
consent requirement in the research context. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 48, at 185.
However, it is difficult to distinguish the protection of harm function from the function of
promoting self-determination as the two objectives are intertwined and advancing one
interest often helps further respect for the other. See id. at 186.
72. See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
1978). In
Mink, the plaintiffs were pregnant women who were given DES during their prenatal care
as participants in an experiment evaluating the efficacy of the drug at preventing miscarriages. See id.at 715. The plaintiffs sued under both negligence and battery theories,
alleging injury from the increased risk of cancer to their daughters and for resulting emotional distress. See id at 715-16. The court allowed the battery claim even though the
classic situation of nonconsensual touching was not present. See id at 717-18. Although
not expressly stated in the opinion, the nature of the nonconsensual research seems to
have motivated the court to depart from traditional tort principles. See id at 716-18; see
also Shultz, supra note 60, at 258-60, 274 (discussing the decision in Mink and concluding
"that there need be no implication of wrongdoing in the narrow sense of that word to
justify aggressive protection of patient choice").
73. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175 (West 1992); 28 PA. CODE
§ 553.12 (1994).
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hospitals, from participating in experimental research.74 The state
statutes usually permit experimentation with other incompetent persons if a legally effective surrogate consents or if a court order is
obtained. 75 But these statutes do not directly address the problems of
consent in the critical care research context by, for example, providing for waiver of informed consent if a patient's legal representative
is not immediately available. 7' In addition, many state experimentation statutes contain automatic preemption language stating that they
are intended to be preempted by the federal regulations with regard
to federally-funded research.77 Thus, the state laws that could be interpreted to permit relaxation of consent standards in critical care
situations may not make a practical difference since most critical care
research will be subject
to the federal regulations because of their
78
broad applicability.
Nearly every state has professional licensing statutes governing
the professional conduct of physicians. 79 In theory, a physician conducting research without proper consent procedures could be deemed
to be engaged in unprofessional conduct under these laws and face
74. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(8) (West 1989).

75. See

CAL. HEALTH

&

SAFETY CODE

§ 24175(b) (permitting conservator of pa-

tient adjudicated incompetent to consent where patient does not object to participation or
where conservator acts in good faith during an emergency, but requiring conservator of
patient who has not been adjudicated incompetent to obtain court order before being
allowed to consent on patient's behalf where patient refuses to consent); 410 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 50/3.1 (West 1993) (permitting consent of patient's guardian, spouse, parent, or authorized agent for experimental procedures if patient is unable to consent); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1993) (permitting experimentation with person
unable to render consent if a party legally empowered to act for the patient consents in
writing); 28 PA. CODE. § 553.12(b)(10) (patient bill of rights for patients at state-licensed
ambulatory surgery centers provides that "responsible person" may give consent for enrolling patient in medical care research program where patient is unable to give informed
consent); VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 32.1-162.16 to -162.18 (Michie 1992) (allowing consent to
research of legally authorized representative of patient if patient not competent, but not
defining clearly who the legally authorized representative is other than custodial parent
or guardian).
76. Also, the statutes are often narrowly worded and in some instances have been
interpreted to apply only when there is a clear research protocol, as opposed to when a
clinician uses an innovative or experimental therapy in the course of regular treatment.
See, e.g., Trantafello v. Medical Ctr. of Tarzana, 227 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that California's experimentation statute did not apply because physician's use of
new acrylic compound for bone graft was used not in the course of a research program,
but in the course of therapeutic treatment).
77. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2445 (McKinney 1993).
78. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2000-2099 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996)
(outlining medical licensing requirements); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-2 to -21 (1993) (same);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b (West Supp. 1996) (same).
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losing his license. However, there have been few cases in which the
medical licensing laws have been applied to suspend the licenses of
physicians for conducting improper research.o
3. Surrogate Consent
A common practice of hospitals and emergency room physicians
is to rely on next-of-kin or other surrogate consent to make medical
decisions when a patient is unable to provide consent. Although this
may be the recognized custom, few cases address the legality of such
practices in the context of standard medical practice, let alone medical research.8' Even fewer cases address who is authorized to act as
the surrogate for the critical care patient (e.g., parent, spouse, close
family friend, etc.). 82
The legality of surrogate consent has been considered for the
most part in the context of right-to-die cases. Several states allow
surrogates to make health care decisions with drastic consequences,
such as the decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.8 In addition, certain of these states allow for the default appointment of a
surrogate in the event that the health care provider is unable to locate a legally authorized representative. Maryland, for example,
allows the spouse, adult child, parent, sibling, or even close friend of
the patient to consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if
the patient is in a terminal condition, persistent vegetative state, or
an advanced, progressive and irreversible debilitating condition."
80. See Goldner, supra note 55, at 67.
81. See Elaine B. Krasik, The Role of the Family in Medical Decision-making For
Incompetent Adult Patients: A HistoricalPerspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. P1T. L.
REv. 539,548 (1987).

82. See Meisel, Striking a Balance, supra note 14, at 473. Some states have enacted

laws authorizing surrogate consent for medical care that identify the possible surrogates

who may consent for an incapacitated patient. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §3 313.001 to .007 (West Supp. 1996) (identifying surrogates but not clearly authorizing surrogate consent for research).
83. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
1984) ("[T]he right of a patient, who is in an irreversibly comatose and essentially vegetative state to refuse extraordinary life-sustaining measures, may be exercised either by his
or her close family members or by a guardian of the patient appointed by the court.");
Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to impose

criminal liability upon physician for removing intravenous feeding line from vegetative
comatose patient at family's request).

84. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 5-605 (1994). For examples of similar
statutes, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210 (Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2960-2978
(McKinney 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.635, 127.640 (1995); TaX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. §§ 313.001 to .007 (West Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (Michie
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Most states with such surrogacy statutes require that the surrogate use the "substituted judgment" standard and make the decision
as the patient would have done. A minority of states, either through
legislation or case law, reject this standard and instead require that
the decision be made in the "best interests" of the patient.86 Some
states combine the best interest and substituted judgment standards.
One of the more detailed statutes, Illinois' Health Care Surrogate
Act, allows for the appointment of surrogates for patients who lack
decision-making capacity and have terminal conditions, are in a state
of permanent unconsciousness, or in an incurable or Irreversible condition causing severe pain or imposing significant burdens.7 The
possible surrogates, in order of priority as specified in the statute,
have the right to consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment."3 The surrogate is supposed to make the decision based on the
patient's wishes under the circumstances or, if not known, by acting
in the patient's best interests.89 Yet, despite this progressive statute
providing patients lacking decisional capacity a mechanism to implement their presumed choices, Illinois has not enacted similar detailed
legislation directly applicable to critical care research. 90
The related case law dealing with withdrawal of medical care
provides some support for the practice of surrogates consenting to
experimental medical treatment. Increasingly, courts have held that
the common-law right to self-determination, which includes the right
to refuse medical treatment, may be asserted by surrogates for incompetent patients. 91 However, these cases are distinguishable to the
1994).
85. See Robert M. Portman, SurrogateDecision-Making Legislation: The Next Frontier in Life-Sustaining Treatment Policy,24 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 311,314 (1991).
86. See id; see also CLAIRE C. OBADE, PATIENT CARE DECISION-MAKING: A
LEGAL GUIDE FOR PROVIDERS §§ 9:2-9:4 (1995) (describing the distinctions between the
"best interests" and "substituted judgment" standards).
87. See 755 ILL. dOMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1993).

8& See id. 40/25.
89. See id. 40/20.
90. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3.1. The Illinois Medical Patient Rights Act
provides that if the patient is unable to consent to experimental therapy, a guardian,
spouse, parent or "authorized agent" may consent for the patient. But the statute, in
contrast to the Health Care Surrogate Act governing withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, is silent on many key issues. See id It does not indicate under what circumstances
the patient may be presumed unable to consent, limits the number of surrogates, without
indicating their relative priority, and does not provide guidance as to how the surrogate is
supposed to make the decision. See id.
91. See, e.g., Degrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698,709 (Ky. 1993) (permitting a mother
to employ "substituted judgment" in order to refuse artificial nutrition for daughter in
persistent vegetative state); In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 922-23 (Miech. Ct. App. 1993)
(permitting a surrogate to discontinue treatment of a brain-damaged but nonvegetative
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extent that they concern treatment decisions involving application
and withdrawal of standard therapy, as opposed to the special circumstances involved in consenting to experimentation. Medical
research, as noted above, may require special vigilance with respect
to obtaining the patient's consent because of the unknown risks involved and because the therapy has certain research goals that are
beyond the needs and interests of the individual patient. In addition,
the withdrawal of care cases often involve patients in persistent vegetative states, where there is time for reasoned deliberation about the
patient's values and treatment preferences and the ultimate prognosis
and where, practically speaking, the patient's opportunity for directly
consenting or objecting is permanently lost. Indeed, courts have
been less willing to recognize a patient's right to make medical decisions through a surrogate when the patient suffers a temporary
neurological deficit and will not likely be deemed permanently incompetent. 92
Accordingly, in the absence of specific authorizing legislation,
researchers and medical institutions relying upon surrogate consent
for application of experimental therapies face potential liability. This
is especially true when the enrolled patient suffers only temporary
decisional incapacity. Liability for negligent medical care is likely to
be greater when informed consent is waived for an unconscious patient who may regain medical decision-making capacity than for a
patient in a life-threatening situation who is unlikely to survive application of standard therapy.
4. Emergency Exception
All jurisdictions recognize an exception to informed consent for
medical treatment in emergency care situations. 9, Some states have a
statute expressly recognizing the emergency exception, 4 while in
patient through either a "best interest" or "substituted judgment" approach depending on
the circumstances); Delio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 693-94

(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (allowing surrogate to assert, on the behalf of a patient in persis-

tent vegetative state, the patient's right to self-determination based on wishes expressed
by the patient prior to losing cognizance).

92. See OBAnE, supra note 86, § 8.13, at 8-28.
93. See Meisel, Striking a Balance, supra note 14, at 439 (recognizing the close relation between the emergency exception to the informed consent doctrine and the

exception for incompetent patients).
94. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 5-607 (1994) (allowing treatment
without consent where treatment is of "an emergency medical nature" and physician de-

termines that life or health of patient would be adversely affected by delaying treatment);
35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6933 (West 1993) (eliminating civil liability for health profes-

sionals who fail to obtain consent in rendering emergency medical services where patient
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other jurisdictions the exception has been developed through case
law.95 Under the exception, medical providers may render treatment
to patients who are incapable of making an informed decision if a
person authorized to give consent is not immediately available and
there is an emergency situation requiring rapid medical treatment.
While the emergency exception contemplates application of accepted medical therapies, it is less clear whether experimental
therapy falls within the exception. One view is that the emergency

exception justifies waiving prospective informed consent of the critical care patient because if the physician does not know what therapy
is best, he or she does all that can be done by enrolling the patient in
an experiment with a predesigned protocol for random allocation. 96
However, the basis for the emergency exception is that consent

may be implied because a reasonable person would agree to such
therapy under the circumstances if not suffering from decisional in-

capacity. 97 When the therapy applied is experimental, it is not as easy
to imply patient preferences. First, the lack of knowledge about the
experimental therapy makes the risk/benefit analysis much more
complicated than when evaluating standard treatment in emergency
situations." For example, the Cardiopump holds out the promise of
restoring circulatory function better than current CPR techniques for
cardiac arrest victims. On the other hand, the device does not necessarily hold out the same promise of restoring neurological function,
is unable to consent, no other authorized representative is available, and health professional acts in good faith).
95. See, e.g., Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1970); Estate of Leach
v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047,1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
96. See, e.g., Norman S. Abramson et al., Informed Consentin ResuscitationResearch,
246 JAMA 2828,2830 (1981).
97. See, e.g., Ellen Covner Weiss, The Effect of the Treatment Setting on the DecisionMaking Process: Acute Care Hospitals and Emergency Services, 19 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 66,67 (1991).
98. For example, the drug-maker Upjohn recently suspended a clinical trial of the
drug Freedox (tirilazad) administered to head-injury victims because of an unexpected
number of high deaths in the experimental arm of the trial compared to the placebo arm.
The research involved head-injury victims from whom obtaining informed consent was
difficult. See Institutional Review Boards Should Be Entrusted With Informed Consent
Waiver, HEALTH NEWS DAILY, Jan. 11, 1995, at 4-5. The history of internal carotid artery bypass surgery for the prevention of strokes also illustrates the dangers of relying on
clinical intuition and faith in new procedures to waive informed consent. The bypass procedure initially generated positive reports from the field. Nearly a decade after it was
introduced, an international randomized trial demonstrated that contrary to expectations,
the procedure was related to an increased risk of death from strokes. See EC/IC Bypass
Study Group, Failureof Extracranial-Intracranial
Arterial Bypass to Reduce the Risk of
Ischemic Stroke: Results of an InternationalRandomized Trial, 313 NEW ENG. 3. MED.
1191, 1191 (1985).
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thus increasing the chance that a "rescued" patient would still have
brain damage. Given these particular risks and benefits, some persons would opt for the experimental treatment but quite clearly
others would decline, regardless of whether the Cardiopump is the
best possible medical intervention for the emergency.99
More importantly, justifying waiver of consent in critical care research because, in the physician's judgment, the patient stands an
equal chance of benefiting from the experimental therapy as the
standard treatment greatly diminishes the principle of patient autonomy. Notwithstanding the physician's best intentions and judgment,
this rationale ignores the fact that an actual experimental study is underway. Ordinarily, the patient must make the independent moral
determination whether to become an experimental subject. Knowing
that a therapy is experimental changes the nature and character of
the patient's decision. °° Patients may be either less willing to consent
to therapy when they understand the research aspects or if they do
consent, the reasons may be other than the prospect of direct medical
benefit.' O' The research subject may be motivated by, for example,
altruism or the sense of having no hope.'O' Thus, any characterization
of the reasonable person's preferences must be suspect. Individual
value systems can lead patients to decline experimental therapy even
when there is no apparent difference between the risks of standard
versus experimental therapy and the experimental therapy holds
great promise of benefit.
C. ConstitutionalLaw
Research involving critical care patients without prospective informed consent also raises thorny constitutional problems. Because
the exact nature and contours of the constitutional right to control
medical decisions is still evolving in medical jurisprudence, the scope
and application of the right is unclear. Fully exploring and resolving
the constitutional issues implicated by critical care research is beyond
the intended scope of this Article. Indeed, research in the critical
99. A review of the limited Cardiopump studies to date shows that, on the whole, the
plunger device improves intermediate outcomes. However, no study has demonstrated
improvement in the critical measure of neurologically intact survival to hospital discharge. See Olson & Rennie, supra note 4, at 1299; Problems in Securing Informed
Consent, supra note 11, at 18 (testimony of Arthur Caplan, Director, Center for Bioethics,
University of Pennsylvania).
100. See King, supranote 62, § 7.13, at 510.
101. See id. at 510-11.
102. See id at 511.
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care setting likely raises issues of first impression concerning the constitutional right to accept or decline medical care. This subsection
merely identifies the basic issues implicated as a reminder that there
may be constitutional limits to efforts to relax or modify the informed
consent requirement.
Whether articulated as part of the constitutional right to privacy
or as part of the constitutionally protected liberty interest, patients
clearly have some constitutional rights with respect to declining
medical treatment. However, the constitutional parameters are not
well articulated and the constitutional rights themselves can be counterbalanced by other interests."'
Constitutional privacy cases involving birth control, abortion,
and the right to withhold life-saving treatment recognize the constitutional right of patients104to maintain their privacy against unconsentedto medical treatment. Courts also have held that incompetent pa103. See, e.g., Doe v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12, 17-18 (D.D.C.), affd, 938 F.2d 1370
(D.C. Cir. 1991). In Sullivan, the district court denied a motion to enjoin the Department
of Defense from using unapproved drugs on troops taking part in Operation Desert Storm
without first obtaining consent from individual military personnel. See id. at 13. The
court recognized service members' constitutional liberty interest in receiving full information and the need to obtain their informed consent before administration of unapproved
drugs. See id at 14. But the court scrutinized the policy under the rational basis test and
found a legitimate countervailing governmental interest in furthering the military goals of
Operation Desert Storm. See id at 17-18. The government contended that it needed to
administer the drugs uniformly to prevent unnecessary danger to troops. See id. at 17.
104. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing a
long line of cases protecting personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and education as including choices central to personal
autonomy and dignity which are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(assuming, for purposes of the decision, that the Fourteenth Amendment affords a liberty
interest in refusing life-saving nutrition and hydration and recognizing a general liberty
interest in refusing medical treatment); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790,
816, 836-39 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (declaring unconstitutional a Washington law prohibiting physicians from prescribing life-ending medications to terminally ill patients and
finding a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in determining the time and manner of
one's own death, which encompasses a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment), stay grantedsub. nom, Washington v. Gluckberg, 116 S. Ct. 2494 (1996), cert
granted,65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1,1996) (No. 96-110); cf. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,
729-30 (2d Cir. 1996) (declaring unconstitutional on Equal Protection Clause grounds two
New York statutes penalizing assistance in suicide as applied to physicians aiding the
death of terminally ill patients), cerL granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
95-1858). Often, state constitutions may provide the clearer source of authority for the
right to accept or decline medical treatment. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a privacy right
under the California Constitution of a quadriplegic woman to seek removal of nasogastric
tube inserted and maintained against her consent for purpose of keeping her alive
through involuntary force feeding).
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tients, despite the loss of decisional capacity, maintain a constitutional right to privacy regarding medical treatment and that the right,
in order to be preserved, may0be exercised by a surrogate when the
patient is unable to consent.
Other courts, however, have determined that the right is "personal" and "peculiar to the individual"
and can be invoked by the individual only "when that individual is a
competent and alert adult.""' Thus, conducting research with critical
care patients without obtaining prospective informed consent, or relying on the consent of a surrogate, raises difficult constitutional
issues. Pending a clearer resolution of the federal constitutional issues by the federal courts, the ability to use surrogates to consent to
critical care research likely will depend in significant respects on differing state constitutional standards for protection of privacy.
II. LEADING PROPOSALS FOR CONDUCTING CRITICAL CARE
RESEARCH

Because of the legal obstacles to conducting critical care research, clinical investigators and other commentators have advanced
different approaches for modifying the informed consent requirements. This section reviews several leading proposals, apart from the
new FDA reforms. Certain approaches have, of course, been proposed in combination with one another, but it is useful to examine
each in isolation and identify its merits and weaknesses. This examination first requires, however, a threshold consideration of whether
the informed consent requirements should be changed at all, in order
to identify more clearly the implications of relaxing informed consent.
A. Why Allow CriticalCare Research Without Prospective Consent?
The federal agencies regulating medical experimentation inter105. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
424,431-32 (Mass. 1977) (relying on constitutional privacy right and common-law right to
informed consent to permit withholding of chemotherapy from a profoundly retarded 67year-old man suffering from leukemia); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 429-30 (N.J. 1987)
(holding that surrogate, authorized by health care power of attorney, may elect to refuse
life-sustaining treatment for 65-year-old nursing home patient in vegetative state); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing right of incompetent patient to
refuse medical treatment and that this right may be asserted on patient's behalf when
patient is incapable of exercising it on her own).
106. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1041 (Miss. 1985). Such cases have generally involved refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment, which may explain some courts'
heightened scrutiny regarding the need for informed consent and reluctance to allow the
constitutional right to be asserted by a surrogate.
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pret congressional intent as requiring that biomedical research be
conducted in accord with the highest contemporary ethical standards.' ° Thus, the legal merits of any regulatory reforms stand, in
part, on how well they address the ethical issues raised by critical care
research. A full-fledged ethical analysis is beyond the intent and
scope of this Article, but it is useful to examine briefly the theoretical
ethical issues underlying the informed consent requirement as applied to critical care research. This subsection reviews the ethical
implications of relaxing informed consent in critical care research
under the three guiding principles of biomedical ethics: beneficence,
justice, and autonomy. The Belmont Report, upon which the HHS
and FDA regulations are based, noted that these three guiding principles are not capable of resolving biomedical ethical conflicts
beyond dispute, nor are they always capable of consistent application.3 s Nevertheless, the principles provide an analytical framework
to guide consideration of the ethical issues implicated by critical care
research.'09
1. Beneficence
The principle of beneficence requires the provision of benefits to
help others in a manner that minimizes the imposition of risk."0
Complementary to the principle of beneficence is the concept of nonmaleficence, or doing no harm."' In the research setting, this re-

107. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086,
49,090 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21, 1995) (FDA noting
that this congressional purpose reflected in both the Drug Amendments of 1962 and the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976).
108. See Belmont Report,supra note 27, at 2.
109. See id Alternative methods have been proposed for resolving bioethical issues
which call for a more inductivist, contextual analysis, moving beyond reasoning at the
level of abstract principles and universal norms and paying closer attention to the pragmatic impact of bioethical and legal rules, with special attention to differences associated
with race, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic condition. See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf,
Shifting Paradigmsin Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism,20 AM.
J.L. & MED. 395,395 (1994). The discussion of the guiding principles in this Article is not
meant to diminish the importance of ethical analysis of critical care research by alternative methods. The principle-based approach can coexist with and be complemented by
alternative paradigms. See Tom Beauchamp, Principlesand Other Emerging Paradigms
in Bioethics, 69 IND. L.J. 955, 961, 971-72 (1994). Indeed this Article calls for further
attention to the pragmatic impact of changed informed consent requirements in an attempt to fill out and refine the application of the guiding principles. See text
accompanying note 234.
110. See TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHIcs 260 (4th ed. 1994).
111. See id. at 190-96.
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quires that the risks associated with research be reasonable in light of
the expected benefits, and that all possible benefits be maximized
and the chance of harm minimized" The Belmont Report also acknowledged that beneficence involves application at two different
levels-within the particular study at hand and within the research
enterprise in general.'3 While research should be designed so as to
maximize benefits and reduce risks to particular subjects, ethical
the fact that research participation can
analysis may also account11for
4
benefit society as a whole.
Thus, waiver of consent in critical care research is consistent with
beneficence in circumstances where there is vigilant review of the
study design to ensure that the likely benefits and harms meet acceptable levels. Also, as noted previously, much of what has been
accepted as standard therapy in the critical care setting has not been
systematically evaluated for safety and efficacy. Beneficence suggests, therefore, that critical care research be encouraged because
further investigation will help other patients (and the subject in the
future) by demonstrating the relative difference between investigational and standard interventions.1
2. Justice
The principle of justice requires that the distribution of societal
benefits and burdens involves fairness of treatment."' With respect
to medical experimentation, this means that the distribution of benefits and burdens of research should be equitable." Researchers must
ensure that subjects, especially vulnerable persons, are chosen because their condition is essential and relevant to what is being studied
and not because of other reasons involving differential treatment.'
In addition, subject selection should account for the potential bene-

112. See Larry Gostin, Ethical Principlesfor the Conduct of Human Subject Research:
Population-BasedResearchand Ethics, 19 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 191, 192 (1991).

In addition, consider the FDA's discussion of the ethical principles underlying its proposed rule included in Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. at
49,093-94.
113. See Belmont Repor4 supra note 27, at 7.
114. See id.
115. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,093-94.
116. See MUNsON, supra note 16, at 38.
117. Seeid

118. For example, the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Study violated the justice principle
because primarily poor African-Americans were chosen as subjects and this racial and
economic classification was not essential to the scientific merits of the investigation. See
generally JONES, supra note 25 (discussing this experiment).
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fits of experimental therapy by providing research participation opportunities in a fair and open manner. 19 Categorically excluding
critical care patients from participation in clinical trials because of
informed consent difficulties conflicts with the justice principle. This
denies the opportunity of research participation to a vulnerable
population, patients with diminished capacity, and directly withholds
the potential benefits that may arise from research directed toward
alleviating the conditions causing their diminished capacity.
Consistent with the principle of justice, IRBs are charged with
ensuring that the selection of research subjects is "equitable."' 12 The
direction to ensure "equitable" selection of subjects can be interpreted as requiring the preservation of the critical care patient's
opportunity to participate in research or refuse investigational treatment.
Waiving or modifying informed consent requirements for
critical care research helps to ensure a more equitable distribution of
research costs and benefits, assuming that safeguards are observed so
that the critical care population does not disproportionately bear the
burdens of research that could be carried out with other populations."2 Research with vulnerable critical care patients that could be
conducted as effectively with other populations would not satisfy the
requirements of justice.
3. Respect for Patient Autonomy
The principle of respect for patient autonomy presents the most
serious obstacle to relaxing informed consent requirements in critical
care research. Autonomy recognizes people as independent moral
agents whose choices should be respected and observed.' Autonomy involves "personal rule of the self" and the exercise of
meaningful decisions that are not controlled by others. With regard
to research, the autonomy principle suggests that persons with diminished capacity need to be protected or even excluded from the
124
harms of unconsented-to research. The ethical problems associated
with forced enrollment in research arise not only from the threat of
physical injury, but also from the moral wrong committed by using
other persons merely as means (research object) to an end (the study
conclusions). Autonomy generally would require that a patient pro119.
120.
121.
122.

See Gostin, supra note 112, at 191.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (1995).
See Moore, supra note 7, at 571.
See id.
at 573.

123. See id.
124. See Gostin, supra note 112, at 191, 194.
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vide consent in order to become a co-adventurer with the investigator
and willingly adopt the research objectives as his or her own. 12
Some would argue that under critical care circumstances, the
competing principles of beneficence and justice simply override
autonomy concerns. Alternatively, others would insist that respect
for autonomy means that the principle can never be compromised.
Neither of these extreme positions proves satisfactory. Allowing beneficence and justice concerns to overwhelm autonomy concerns
merely underscores the reason why respect for autonomy is needed
as a guiding ethical principle in the first place. Biomedical ethicists
have distinguished between "strong" and "weak" paternalism in
medicine. Strong paternalism occurs when the physician alone de
126
p~rsic127de
cides what is in the best interests of the patient. 2 Such practices
clearly violate the ethical bases of informed consent. 2 8 Overriding a
person's judgment shows lack of respect for the person as an
autonomous agent and denies others the freedom to act as moral
agents. 121 Indeed, the law's increasing focus on informed consent and
the corresponding nascent patient-consumer movement developed in
large part as responses to the medical profession's traditional paternalism, a system that failed to acknowledge the patient as the
legitimate medical decision-maker.
Allowing the physicianresearcher to waive informed consent requirements and also make
the substantive medical decisions tilts too far in favor of professional
authority over the patient. The informed consent requirement generally serves as a check and counterbalance to the physicianinvestigator's natural enthusiasm for and advocacy of experimental
technologies.2 5
In contrast, the "weak" form of medical paternalism recognizes
that the patient has the prerogative to make self-governing decisions,
but also that the physician remains obligated to make such decisions
under circumstances where the patient cannot truly make an
autonomous decision.5 "Under these circumstances, the physician is
obligated to act for the patient but always, if possible, to remove the
obstacles to an autonomous decision and to empower the patient's
125. See Capron, supra note 48, at 185-86.
126. See, e.g., Edmund Pellegrino, Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Experimental Subject's Consent: A Response to Jay Katz, 38 ST. LouiS U. L.. 55,58-59 (1993).

127. See iL
128. See id. at 59.
129. See Gostin, supra note 112, at 193.
130. See King & Henderson, supra note 62, at 1032.
131. See Pellegrino, supra note 126, at 59.
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decision-making capacity to the fullest extent possible."'32 For example, waiver of informed consent can be justified as respecting the
patient's personal dignity if the patient, because of the stress of illness, desires waiver to avoid having to make a decision he or she does
not want to make." Thus, if informed consent is to be relaxed at all
in the critical care setting, this should occur only under a weak paternalism framework and not through a full-fledged abandonment of
autonomy concerns.
Too rigid a respect for autonomy, however, can lead to inflexible
rules that fail to consider the importance of beneficence and justice.
Biomedical ethicists generally do not recognize the autonomy principle as paramount to the other guiding principles. m At times,
autonomy must give way to competing ethical concerns and the realities of medical practice1 5 Indeed, it is simply misleading to insist on
prospective informed consent as the gold standard for critical care
research. In reality, the consent provided by non-critical care patients enrolling in investigational trials is not truly informed because
patient-subjects are rarely told, in terms they understand, the probabilities and uncertainties inherent in biomedical research. 6
Personal autonomy is already compromised in most medical settings.
Patients are usually in vulnerable states and are prone to unwarranted or uncritical acceptance of a physician's or researcher's
recommendations." 7 Moreover, the value of autonomy varies with
the range of choices realistically available to the patient. Where the
patient has few or no treatment options available that may offer
likely benefit, meaningful choice is necessarily limited, and respecting

132. Id.
133. See Meisel, Striking a Balance,supra note 14, at 459.
134. Cf. MUNSON, supra note 16, at 43-45 (addressing philosophical principles that
may be employed to justify restricting patient autonomy).
135. Cf. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supranote 110, at 181.
136. Numerous studies have shown that patients illogically process the probability
information provided to them under informed consent procedures. Common errors include underutilizing base rate information (giving disproportionate weight to an isolated,
specific piece of information), inability to combine and assess multiple risks, and giving
excess weight to memorable examples while undervaluing more abstract presentations of
data. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the

Law of Torts: The Myth of JusticiableCausation,1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 627-34. Other
studies call into question whether patients understand the information provided or can
recall that information accurately when a decision must be made. See Alan Meisel &
Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent" A Review and
Critique ofthe EmpiricalStudies, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 265,292-98 (1983).
137. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENTWORLD OFDOCTOR AND PATIENT chs. V-VI (1984).
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autonomy becomes less paramount. 38

Relaxation of consent requirements can be attempted while still
ensuring a large degree of respect for autonomy. There are alternatives, admittedly imperfect, to individual consent. Consultation with
peers representative of the subject or the use of surrogates can help
approximate the subject's preferences and facilitate the selfdetermination process critical to the principle of autonomy. 3 9 In this
manner, the subject's moral choices are acknowledged as meriting
serious consideration by establishing procedures that approximate
what such decisions would be under the circumstances. Approximation of the wishes of the patient lacking full autonomy is one
condition, but not the only condition, that should be present before
relaxing the consent requirement for impaired subjects. It is important that the research design be reviewed critically to ensure that
subjects are protected from unwarranted potential harm. Strict study
design criteria, including the thorough minimization of risk and the
direct relevance of the investigation to the subject's condition, should
apply before persons unable to consent are enrolled in an experiment. 14
Of course, even if waiving informed consent can be defended
under limited circumstances as consistent with autonomy by giving
voice to the patient's presumed preferences, the question remains
whether this provides sufficient justification. Many legal barriers
prevent persons from having their intent effectuated. For example,
in most states, the parol evidence rule forbids oral testimony regarding variation of the terms of a written contract.' 4' Similarly, most
states require that wills be in writing and refuse to enforce oral
agreements to leave property by will.' 4 These laws frustrate individual intent.
But the critical care research setting may be
distinguishable because of the inherently personal nature of the decision to undergo experimental medical treatment and the often drastic
and immediate consequences involved. In addition, in the other
situations there may exist alternate readily available legal mechanisms to express one's intent (e.g., amend a contract, draft a will)
138. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 925
(1994).

139. See Capron, supra note 48, at 188.
140. Cf. Gostin, supra note 112, at 194 ("Traditional micro-ethical principles... require [that] ... vulnerable subjects [be]... selected only if the research is directly
relevant to the person or class of persons.").
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFPROPERTY (Donative Transfers) § 33.1 (1992).
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before becoming incapacitated. Establishing legally effective proof
of prior consent to experimental treatment remains difficult at best. 43
In sum, a brief review of the ethical principles indicates that
valid justifications exist for relaxing or waiving the informed consent
requirement in the critical care setting, but the specific protections
required and the manner in which the consent requirements may be
waived are subject to reasonable disagreement. The best compromise of the difficult ethical considerations is to insist that critical care
research accommodate personal autonomy in some fashion even if
prospective informed consent is not feasible. This can be accomplished by approximating the patient's preferences through use of
surrogate consent mechanisms, or limiting conduct of the research to
situations where it may be legitimately assumed reasonable persons
would consent, or both. In addition, the principles of autonomy and
beneficence direct that critical care trials relaxing informed consent
requirements be of especially rigorous design.
In light of these ethical considerations and the preceding discussion of the legal obstacles, the remainder of this section discusses
several leading approaches, apart from the new FDA rules, for addressing the problems of informed consent in critical care research.
B. Waiver of Consent
One obvious approach to addressing the problems of informed
consent in critical care research would be to waive the informed consent requirement altogether. Certain investigators have maintained
that the emergency exception should be extended to critical care research.' 44 The argument is that the physician is ethically bound to do
what is best for the patient in a study, including providing experimental therapies. According to this view, if the physician believes that an
investigational therapy may be better for the critical care patient, he
or she must choose that for the patient.' 45 Similarly, if the researcher
truly does not know which therapy is better and has a predesigned
protocol for assigning patients to standard and investigational therapies, the physician is still exercising his or her best clinical judgment
by enrolling the patient in a randomized study'"4
The inclination to override patient autonomy is understandable.
Subjects in critical care research situations are suffering from deci143.
144.
145.
146.

See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
See Abramson et al., supra note 96, at 2829.
See id.
See iL at 2829-30.
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sional incapacity, and it is difficult for physicians operating on the
front line and providing urgent care to dissociate the patient from the
condition. As Sachs and Cassel observe:
When writers emphasize the principle of autonomy in discussing informed consent, they have us envision a subject
who is an active participant, even a partner, in the research
endeavor. In contrast, when physicians and other investigators see demented subjects, they most often see people who
have already formally or informally given over decisionmaking authority even for many of their simple
daily activi147
ties to a family member or other caregiver.
But, as discussed previously, the reasons for the emergency exception to the informed consent doctrine do not support waiving
informed consent requirements where clinical investigations are involved.' 8 The emergency exception reflects the societal judgment
that providing medical care without a patient's consent in an emergency is permissible because reasonable persons would consent to
such treatment if they were capable and the medical care provided is
likely to benefit the patient. In experimental settings, where the
benefits and risks are largely unknown and the treatment participation decisions more complicated, these factors cannot be presumed
with the same level of confidence. 49
Moreover, justifying waiver of informed consent solely on the
premise that the investigator must and will act for the patient's benefit overemphasizes the principle of beneficence at the expense of
valid, competing concerns. Presumably, most researchers believe
that the experimental therapy under investigation will benefit the patient. But the reason the research is being done is to demonstrate
whether this hypothesis is statistically valid by generalizable study
results. The researcher's treatment preference, where experimental
therapy is involved, cannot be used as the sole justification for enrolling the subject.
First, this inclination can be wrong and patients need to be protected against physical harm due to uncritical reception of new
technologies.5
Apart from patient safety concerns, allowing researcher-initiated waiver of informed consent invites disregard for
the law by making the informed consent requirements easily subject
147. Greg A. Sachs & Christine K. Cassel, Biomedical Research Involving Older Human Subjects, 18 LAW MED. & H-EALTH CARE 234,237 (1990) (footnote omitted).

148. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
149. See Delgado &Leskovac, supranote 62, at 90-91.
150. Cf. supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.

1996]

INFORMED CONSENT

to manipulation or deliberate evasion. Too much emphasis on beneficence leads to dangerous paternalism. 5 ' A general waiver
approach, with no other compensating safeguards, conceals the fact
that the patient is being asked to participate in an experimental, unknown undertaking. In the modem era, medical uncertainty is
pervasive and differences of opinion are resolved only on the basis of
risk assessment and individual value preferences. Thus, "[m]edical
choice increasingly depends on factors that transoend professional
training and knowledge.... Health care choices involve profound
questions that are not finally referable to professional expertise."'5 2
C. Pre-CriticalCareEpisode Prospective Consent
An alternative approach to complete waiver is to seek consent
from potential subjects well before they find themselves in critical
care situations. In theory, experimental protocols could be designed
that identify and seek consent from patients likely to need investigational therapies in the future because of their present medical
conditions. Because certain medical episodes occur predictably in
special populations, potential experimental subjects could be approached in advance. For example, recovering cardiac arrest patients
could be asked if they would be willing to participate in clinical studies of experimental resuscitation techniques should they again
become incapacitated during the recovery period.' 53
However, the prospective identification of subjects eligible for
investigational treatments is possible only in a small subset of critical
care situations. Because of the uncertainties inherent in medical research, it can prove extremely difficult to identify in advance the class
of patients who will present the right conditions and circumstances
for the experimental protocol.' 4 For an experimental study design to
have any rigor, certain constraints for participation must be established that cannot be predicted in advance of the immediate onset of
the critical care condition. Furthermore, while prospective consent
151. See generally Pellegrino, supra note 126, at 361, 365-66 (revealing the moral dangers and potential conflict of interest in clinical research when the physician is both a
caregiver and physician-scientist).
152. Shult7, supra note 60, at 222.
153. In its preamble notice, the FDA warns that it is not appropriate to invoke the
regulation waiving informed consent when the research subjects can be identified and
their consent sought in advance. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent,
60 Fed. Reg. 49,095 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21, 1995).
154. See Problems in Securing Informed Consent, supra note 11, at 111-16 (discussing
need to seek out prospective consent of disproportionately large number of patients in
order to ensure valid sample size for study of vest-CPR therapy).
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might be readily obtained from already hospitalized patients at risk
for certain medical episodes or conditions, this would exclude nonhospitalized patients from the experimental protocol, which could
significantly bias the research results. To be generalizable, a clinical
study's subject pool must be selected according to entry criteria applicable to a well-defined population. 55 In addition, obtaining the
prospective consent of the minimum number of patients needed to
commence a study would likely be so time consuming that the available information about risks and benefits of the treatment under
investigation could change after the initial period. Presumably, this
would cause further delays because it would likely require the reconsenting of the initial patients who consented based on outdated
information.' 6 Finally, identification of eligible research subjects in
advance is simply not possible for studies involving accident victims,
persons suffering severe head trauma, poisoning, drug overdoses, or
the numerous other critical care episodes not related to progressive
medical conditions.
D. Deferred Consent
IRBs have in some cases approved investigations that employ
"deferred consent."'" Under this approach, the experimental therapy is administered without seeking prospective consent. Instead, the
patient's representative, or the patient if she regains decisional capacity, is told as soon as possible that the therapy has been initiated.
At this point, the patient or her representative has the opportunity to
request withdrawal from the study.
The term "deferred consent" is somewhat misleading because
neither the patient's nor the patient's representatives' consent is actually obtained. Rather, the initial decision to place the patient in the
experiment is either later ratified or rejected. OPRR recently
warned IRBs across the country that deferred consent does not satisfy the federal regulations' informed consent requirements.'
However, until OPRR's statement of policy, deferred consent had

155. See Norman S. Abramson et al., Clinical Trials and CerebralResuscitation Research, 13 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 868,869 (1984).
156. See, e.g., Abramson et al., supra note 10, at 2468.

157. See Spivey et al., supra note 9, at 1253 (defining the term "deferred consent" as it
has developed in the context of emergency medicine).
158. See OPRR Letter, supra note 18 (reiterating the requirement for obtaining
"legally effective informed consent prospectively from each research subject or the subject's legally authorized representative").
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been used in several studies. 5 9
Deferred consent is a superficially clever, but ultimately evasive
approach, for addressing the serious ethical and legal problems involved in critical care research. Deferred consent does very little to
advance the core objectives of the informed consent doctrine because
it provides no special protection for subjects against the unconsented
exposure to risks involved in experimentation. As argued previously,
focusing on the potential benefit to the patient as the sole reason for
relaxing consent requirements does not by itself provide sufficient
justification, nor does it protect patients from the greater potential
risks involved in experimental medicine than in ordinary clinical settings. In many studies, the risk to the patient from the experimental
therapy is immediate, so the mechanism of deferred consent offers an
ineffective remedy.' 6' Withdrawal of the patient from the study can
occur only after the patient has been exposed to the risks inherent in
the experiment.1
In addition, deferred consent does not sufficiently acknowledge
the patient's independent decision-making authority and autonomy
until after the experimentation has begun, which is really too little,
too late. Deferred consent simply weighs too much in favor of beneficence and too little in favor of patient autonomy. The principle
of respect for autonomy imposes difficult yet necessary burdens on
the physician-investigator--primarily that the required disclosures
about the experiment should not be affected by beneficence concerns
that patient-subjects will not make decisions that are in their best interests.
Deferred considerable
consent overrides
important
limitationsthey
by
giving researchers
leewaythese
to make
the decisions
159. See, e.g., Abramson et al., supra note 10, at 2466-67 (describing deferred consent
procedures in the Brain Resuscitation Clinical Trial, a randomized clinical trial of cardiopulmonary-cerebral resuscitation after cardiac arrest); Prentice et al., supra note 12, at 1

(describing randomized trial investigating use of drug for closed head injury as a means of
preventing continuing cerebrovascular damage).
160. See Spivey et al., supra note 9, at 1253.
161. See, e.g., Prentice et al., supra note 12, at 3 (describing how any potential risks in
study of drug administered to closed head injury victims are immediately incurred by the
subject).
162. See Katz, supra note 14, at 32. As Professor Katz has observed, the Belmont Report is confusing because it does not make clear the distinctions between competing
ethical principles that should govern research with competent patients as opposed to in-

competent patients. See id. at 30 n.71. The Belmont Report is even more confusing in
applying the ethical principles to the problem of critical care research where subjects may

suffer from only temporary decisional incapacity. The examples discussed in the Belmont
Report of populations with diminished autonomy, such as children and the mentally ill,

raise different concerns than, for example, a competent adult who may regain decisional
capacity in a short timespan. See Belmont Report, supranote 27.
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think should be made for the patient, irrespective of what the patient
would actually choose.' 3
It is troubling that an investigator should be given such a degree
of discretion in making the decision about research participation.
Because of the nature of critical care research, some investigators
know very little about the subjects involved. CPR research, for example, often occurs with patients admitted to hospital intensive care
units. These facilities are frequently staffed by specialist physicians
who likely have had no previous contact with the patients, and the
primary care physicians play only a marginal role.' Moreover, the
risk/benefit calculations involved in deciding whether to become a
research subject are highly individualistic. For example, if the expected benefit of a cardiac care study is resuscitation, but the study
does not offer other chances for meaningful survival or alleviation of
pain, certain patients would not see this as beneficial and would want
to decline
165 participation if they were able to communicate their preferences.
As the patient's fiduciary, a physician ordinarily would
respect these wishes. But the physician's commitment to the welfare
of the individual "becomes tainted when, without a patient-subject's
full knowledge, we allow the interests of science
and society to in166
trude on the physician-patient relationship.,
Nor is it clear that the family members asked to participate in
deferred consent are in a better position to articulate the patient's
preferences and values. In deferred consent, the surrogate must decide whether to disenroll the subject once the experiment has begun,
a very different decision than whether to begin the experiment at all.
Family members may justifiably question whether the patient's care
and attention will suffer if they request that the subject be removed
from the investigation. For example, in a study of post-resuscitation
coma which employed the deferred consent process, no family member, once informed about the experiment, removed a patient from
trials in progress except when further treatment was regarded as altogether futile. This apparent unanimity in choices of the family
member surrogates suggests that they were not making the deferred
consent decision in accord with what they believe the patient would
163. Deferred consent is also difficult to justify regarding the class of patients that are
conscious but for whom communication may be difficult because it treats them as though
they were incompetent when they are not. See Grim et al., supra note 10, at 254.
164. See Luce, supra note 64, at 696.
165. See Kenneth Iserson, Informed Consent in Acute Care Research, 20 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 1251, 1255 (1991).
166. Katz, supra note 14, at 23.
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have wanted. The fact that the experiment was underway, and the
treatment implications of removing the patient from the investigation, were important factors that presumably
influenced and may
167
have biased the deferred consent process.
E. Advance Directives
In most states, individuals may develop advance directives regarding decisions about health care treatment in the event that they
become incapacitated. However, advance directives are of limited
use in resolving the problems of informed consent in critical care research.
First, they are relatively inflexible mechanisms for
effectuating a patient's wishes in the various situations which may
involve application of experimental therapies. Formal advance care
documents use imprecise terms and obscure hypotheticals; the situation encountered by the patient likely will not correspond accurately
to the text of the directive. Because the terms of advanced directives
are often vague, they are not capable of articulating in sufficient detail the myriad of situations in which persons may face the choice of
experimental treatments.
Advance directives are inadequate
"because no matter how detailed, [they] cannot possibly anticipate
the full range of difficult treatment decisions to be made."'6 In addition, a patient's views may change after execution of the directive.
Perhaps even more important, only a small percentage of the
public executes advance directives, despite opinion polls showing
most Americans want to exercise control of their health care at critical junctures and despite the enactment of the Patient SelfDetermination Act. 69 Estimates indicate that only five to ten percent
of the population have executed advance directives.' 70
Advance directives generally take two different forms. First is
the "living will," a document used to provide directions regarding
preferred medical therapies and the types of treatment the patient
167. See Iserson, supranote 165, at 1256.
168. See Judith Areen, The Legal Status of Consent ObtainedFrom Families of Adult
Patientsto Withhold or Withdraw Treatment,258 JAMA 229,230 (1987).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (1994). The Patient Self-Determination Act requires
hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care providers receiving federal funding to
make information about advance directives available to patients upon admission. See
Ardath A. Hamman, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills
and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. R v. 103, 132-33 (1993); see also Jerry A.
Menikoff et al., Beyond Advance Directives-HealthCare SurrogateLaws, 327 NEW ENG.

J. MED. 1165, 1165 (1992) (identifying reasons why patients may be reluctant to execute
advance directives).

170. See Hamman, supranote 169, at 105; Portman, supranote 85, at 312.
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wishes to refuse. However, state statutes enacted to allow the use of
living wills generally do not contemplate critical care research situations. Most living will laws are applicable only to persons who are
terminally ill and they limit the types of treatment decisions to the
refusal or acceptance of "life-sustaining" treatments or artificial life
support.' Living wills are necessarily limited in scope because they
require a person to predict not only the situation and nature of a lifethreatening illness, but also what medical interventions might be
available.' This presents a significant obstacle to using living wills
for critical care research because the patient may not even be aware
of what experimental therapies will be available in the future and
their associated risks and benefits. Accordingly, living wills usually
do not help settle the question of a patient's preference for participating in medical investigations.
The second type of advanced directive is the assignment of a durable power of attorney to a designated health care proxy.13 Statutes
authorizing durable powers of attorney, often drafted with the intent
of permitting the appointed agent to make financial decisions for the
principal, are now being used to appoint surrogates to make health
care decisions. In addition, states have begun to enact additional
proxy laws specific to health care decision-making, which specify additional information that must be included in the proxy forms and the
standards upon which treatment decisions should be based. Under
these laws, the surrogate is supposed to make decisions consistent
with the wishes of the patient if known; otherwise, the surrogate is
obligated to act in the patient's "best interests."'74
Health care proxies could be helpful for addressing the problems
of critical care research to the extent that they allow a patient expressly to designate a surrogate to make decisions regarding
participation in experimentation. However, the forms rarely make
clear to the patient that the medical decisions made by his or her sur171. For example, Maryland allows persons to make advance directives that become

effective when the attending physician certifies that the patient is unconscious or incapable of making an informed decision. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 5-602(e)
(1995). Although the suggested model form presents a range of critical health care circumstances, such as whether to withdraw artificial hydration and nutrition in the event of
a persistent vegetative state or terminal condition, the form does not contemplate the
administration of experimental therapy during a period of decisional or communicative
incapacity. See id.
§ 5-603.
172. See George J. Annas, The Health CareProxy and the Living Will, 324 NEW ENG.
J.MED. 1210, 1210-11 (1991).

173. See id. at 1211.

174. See id.
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rogate may involve experimental therapies. 7 5 While the patient may
feel comfortable regarding his or her choice of surrogate for standard
therapy, he or she may have different views regarding participation as
an experimental subject. In addition, a document granting durable
power of attorney for health care decisions may be of limited use in
certain critical care research situations, because the designated surrogate may not always be capable of being located in the short time
available to begin the experimental treatment.
I. TH NEw FDA PROPOSAL
The FDA has attempted to overcome the limitations of the preceding approaches by developing an elaborate new regulatory
proposal for relaxing informed consent. This section discusses the
proposed FDA regulations in detail, identifying problems with their
intended scope, ambiguity on several issues, and overall rationale.
Under the proposed FDA rules, the primary responsibility is
placed upon IRBs to determine whether informed consent should be
waived for particular critical care research studies. An IRB may approve a study involving waiver of informed consent if it finds and
documents each of the following:
(1) The human subjects are in a life-threatening situation,
available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory, and the
collection of valid scientific evidence.., is necessary to determine what particular intervention is most beneficial;
(2) Obtaining informed consent is not feasible because:
(i) The subjects will not be able to give consent as a result of their medical condition; and
(ii) The intervention under study must be administered
before consent from legally authorized representatives
is feasible; and
(iii) There is no reasonable way to identify prospectively the individuals likely to become eligible for the
research because the emergence of the condition to be
studied cannot be predicted reliably in particular individuals.
(3) The opportunity for the subjects to participate in the research is in their interest because
175. For example, a Massachusetts model health care proxy appointment form, developed by the state medical society, bar association and other interest groups, is even
shorter and states simply that, subject to certain limitations, the proxy has authority "to
make all health care decisions for [the patient]." See id. at 1213.
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(i) A life-threatening situation necessitates intervention, and
(ii) The risk of the investigation is reasonable in light of
what is known about the medical condition and the
risks and benefits of current therapy, if any, and what is
known about the risks and benefits of the proposed intervention or activity.
(4) The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver.' 76
The proposed regulations also require that before waiving informed consent, IRBs take additional action to safeguard subjects'
rights, including (i) consulting with representatives of the community
from which the subjects will be drawn; (ii) disclosing to the public the
risks and benefits of the study before its commencement and providing public information regarding the results after the study is
completed; and (iii) establishing an independent safety and data
monitoring board."7
Under the proposed rules, subjects who regain decisional capacity must be informed that they are currently participating in an
investigation, or if the subject remains incapacitated, the subject's
family member or the subject's legally authorized representative
must be informed about the inclusion in the research. The subject
(or, if incapacitated, the family member or surrogate) may discon17
tinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits. 1
A. Limited to Imminent, Life-ThreateningSituations
Although the regulations promise to remove significant barriers
to critical care research, several features of the proposed rules are
troubling. First, their scope is too narrow. IRBs are supposed to approve waiver only if subjects are in a "life-threatening situation."
In the preamble to the proposed rule, the FDA indicates that "an
IRB can determine that the subjects are in a life-threatening situation
if it determines that the medical condition being treated by the proposed intervention poses an imminent risk of loss of life."180
Although the regulation does not further define "imminent," the
overall context of the FDA's preamble notice suggests that this
176. Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086, 49,100
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21,1995).

177. See id. at 49,100-01.
178. See id. at 49,101.
179. See id. at 49,100.

180. Id at 49,095.
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means an immediate threat of loss of life within a period no greater
than twenty-four hours.'
Defining imminent risk of loss of life in terms of such a narrow
time-window poses certain problems for diseases or conditions that
are life-threatening, but on progressively longer terms. For example,
most stroke victims do not face risk of loss of life within the twentyfour hour period from onset of the condition."2 The thirty day mor13
tality rate of stroke victims is approximately ten to fifteen percent.
Nevertheless, many experimental stroke therapies, to be effective,
need to be applied rapidly, while the patient often is unable to provide consent. For example, preliminary clinical trials suggest that the
new drug Tissue Plasminogen Activator (TPA) must be applied
within three hours of a stroke to be effective, which leaves little time
because most stroke victims do not reach the hospital and undergo
neurological evaluations until nearly two hours after the stroke. 84
Excluding this population from the proposed rules does not seem fair
given the seriousness of complications arising from stroke and the
life-threatening nature of the disease over the long term.
In addition, the FDA proposed rules seem too narrow in excluding patients who are not in a "life-threatening" situation, but who
could benefit from application of experimental therapy. For example, consider a patient who suffers a serious accident with multiple
body injuries. The patient experiences brain trauma while at the
same time running a risk of serious non-brain injury, such as the loss
of a limb. The patient may be a candidate for certain experimental
tissue regrafting procedures in an attempt to save the arm or leg but
is unable to consent due to the brain trauma, which is being stabilized
by conventional therapy. It is not clear that the FDA rules would
allow waiver of informed consent in these circumstances because application of the experimental therapy is not necessitated by the lifethreatening situation; rather, the experimental treatment of the arm
or leg is secondary to the conventional treatment of the brain trauma.
The distinction between life-threatening situations and others is
181. For example, the preamble notice indicates concerns that nearly all patients dying
within the first 24 hours of a critical care injury do so from processes set in motion at the
time of injury which require intervention in the field. See id. at 49,090.
182. See Per Thorvaldsen et al., Stroke Incidence, Case Fatality, and Mortality in the
WHO MONICA Project,26 STROKE 361,367 (1995).

183. See id.
184. See National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, supra note 10, at
1586; Christine Gorman, Damage Control, TIME, (Special Issue), Fall 1996, at 30, 32;
Gina Kolata, New Study Finds Treatment Helps Stroke Patients, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 14,
1995, at Al.
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simply too crude to make in modem medicine. A life of disfigurement or severe and intractable pain also imposes terrible burdens on
the patient and similarly may justify some encroachment upon
autonomy concerns. Many treatments keep patients "alive" but im1
8
pose their own terrible costs. Accordingly, quality of life factors,
and other inputs, such as sensitivity analysis, pain thresholds, and
mortality rates, are normally taken into account when deciding
whether to initiate treatments.' Similarly, these factors should come
into play when deciding whether the critical care patient is a candidate for experimental therapy.
B. Insufficient Attention to Autonomy Concerns and Disenrollment
Issues
An additional problem with the FDA approach is that the
Agency's justifications for waiver diminish the importance of autonomy as a central concern of informed consent and threaten to
undermine application of the doctrine in the standard therapeutic
setting. Under the FDA's proposed rule, consent could be waived if
a state of "clinical equipoise" exists, where the relative risks of the
proposed intervention are unknown or thought to be equivalent or
better than the standard therapy and available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory."7 This overcompensates for the current
legal rigidity regarding the need for prospective consent by, in effect,
saying that so long as the patient is already in a grave situation and
because the standard therapy is not particularly effective and risk of
death is imminent, the goal of patient consent is not as important as
the potential benefit investigation of new therapies might bring to the
patient and to the population at large. This is not a fair or sensible
balance of the competing interests of patient autonomy and the potential benefits of research.
Patient preferences and value choices should be acknowledged
and accommodated to the extent possible, regardless of the severity
185. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 110, at 156-58 (describing some

patients' inability to adequately assess the impact of medical treatment on their "quality
of life"); Anthony F. Lehman, MeasuringQuality of Life in a Reformed Health System, 14
HEALTH AFF.90, 94-96 (1995).
186. See, e.g., Bruce E. Hillner & Thomas J.Smith, Efficacy and Cost Effectiveness of
Adjuvant Chemotherapy in Women With Node-Negative Breast Cancer,324 NEW ENG. J.

MED. 160, 164-66 (1991); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containmentand Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 778, 791-92, 831-

32 (1986).
187. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086,49,093
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21, 1995).
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of the medical condition or the experimental treatment's likely causation of actual physical injury. Indeed, heightened respect should be
shown for patient self-determination when the patient is in a lifethreatening situation because this is, as a practical matter, the time
when the patient'spreferences and value systems are likely to matter
most. The choices a patient must make (or that must be made when
the patient is unable to do so) when facing serious illness and the risk
of death implicate profoundly personal, moral, and religious issues
such as the value and quality of life, an individual's tolerance for dependence on medical technology, and beliefs about the dying process.
Accordingly, the critical care situation is not the time to minimize the
importance of respecting patient autonomy and the individual's right
to control medical decision-making.
That the FDA has lost sight of this central concept is evident in
the agency's discussion of enrollment of minorities and low-income
patients in critical care trials. In the preamble notice to its proposed
rulemaking, the FDA justifies its new approach in part because it will
likely increase the enrollment of minority and low-income patients in
critical care studies.'u The FDA notes that surrogate consent is more
easily obtained from white and/or middle and upper income family
members than from minority and/or lower income families and
speculates that waiver of informed consent will overcome these barriers and increase the enrollment of all patients 9 The FDA sees this
as consistent with the justice principle, ensuring more equitable access to the benefits of research participation. What the FDA does
not discuss and rightly acknowledge, however, is that the problems in
obtaining surrogate consent from minority and/or low-income family
members suggest that certain patients have clear preferences about
avoiding research participation. Empirical studies indicate that there
can be significant differences by race or ethnicity in attitudes towards
medical decision-making.'O Many African-Americans, for example,
are suspicious of enrolling in clinical trials because of the historic and
disproportionate abuse of black patients in the name of medical research, often without their consent.' 9' To be sure, more needs to be
188. See id,
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Annette Dula, Yes, There areAfrican-American Perspectives on Bioethics, in AFRICAN-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 193, 199 (Harley
Flack & Edmund Pellegrino eds., 1992); Celia J.Orona et al., CulturalAspects of Nondisclosure, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 338,338-39 (1994).
191. See generally Barbara Bernier, Class, Race, and Poverty: Medical Technologies
and Socio-political Choices, 11 HARv. BLACKLETrER J.115 (1994) (tracing the historical
treatment of African-Americans by the medical community in the name of experimental
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done to increase the research participation of minority and lowincome patients. However, respecting patient autonomy means that
this should not be accomplished simply by waiving consent and
making the choice for them. Rather, more difficult steps need to be
taken to educate the applicable communities about the research, as
well as requiring investigators to follow informed consent procedures
with patients or their surrogates that are more refined and racially
and/or culturally sensitive.
In addition, the FDA rules do not provide clear and helpful
guidance about when and if to disenroll a critical care patient. The
proposed regulations require that researchers inform a legal representative and/or family member about the critical care subject's
enrollment as soon as possible. The legally authorized representative
or a family member, if a legal representative is not reasonably available, may then disenroll the subject at any time. 92 Curiously, the
proposed rules allow family members, who are not necessarily legally
authorized persons, to disenroll the patient, even after the IRB has,
in accord with other FDA requirements, reviewed the protocol to
ensure that it poses likely benefits and acceptable risks and has consulted with community representatives about the trial in advance. 93
On the one hand, the FDA seems to say that the subject's participation is justifiable because of the pre-investigation monitoring
procedures followed by the IRB. On the other hand, the Agency allows family members to override this presumption and deny subjects
the likely benefits of research participation, even when the family
members may not be authorized under state law to act as medical decision-makers. No doubt this is a practical recognition of the fact that
continuing the research while family members object would expose
the researchers and medical institutions to possible liability, and
would just plain look bad. However, if family members are allowed
to disenroll the patient, there should be some requirement that this is
done because it approximates what the patient would have wanted.
Disenrolling a patient can have significant medical implications and
the decision should be regarded as important and momentous as the
initial decision to enroll the patient. Unfortunately, the FDA rules
are silent regarding what standards should guide family members in
these instances. The regulations should make clear that family memmedicine from slavery to the present).
192. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. at 49,101. The
proposed rules also allow the patient, if he regains decisional capacity, to choose to disen-

roll. See id.
193. See id.
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bers and any other possible surrogates should use substituted judgment. In addition, the FDA rules need to establish a clear prioritized
hierarchy of decision-makers, so that disagreement among family
members does not lead to protracted and costly disputes.
C. Lax Standardsfor DeterminingAcceptable Risks and Clinical
Equipoise
The state of clinical equipoise envisioned by the FDA's proposed regulations is not a sufficient justification in and of itself for
conducting research without the patient's consent. The FDA rule
defines a state of clinical equipoise as existing when:
the relative benefits and risks of the proposed intervention
are unknown, or thought to be equivalent or better than
standard therapy. Clinical equipoise has been described as
existing when at least a reasonable minority of medical professionals believe the test article is as good as or better than
the standard treatment or that the standard treatment to be
tested is no better than [a] placebo.' 94
This is a vague and elusive criterion. The FDA proposed rules
do not acknowledge directly the inherent uncertainties of biomedical
research. As previously discussed, most researchers in good faith will
believe that a state of clinical equipoise exists. This has been the justification for not doing controlled clinical studies in many cases.' 95
Physicians invariably have an educated hunch going into an experiment that one treatment is superior. However, not obtaining the
patient's informed consent is a real harm, no matter how wellintended the researcher's motivations, because it supplants the patient's choice and value preferences, which can vary widely from the
researcher's. 19' Moreover, too great a reliance on the principle of beneficence can lead to abuse. For example, researchers contemplating
enrolling subjects in an experiment for which it is difficult to talk
frankly and openly about the risks may simply wait for patients to
suffer a period of decisional incapacity, at which point consent can be
deferred or implied. 97
194. Id. at 49,095.
195. See Shult2; supra note 60, at 274.
196. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 98. For example, the subject may
have different views about the research in terms of (1) pain thresholds; (2) embarrassment; (3) making money if the research pays for subjects; and (4) helping the scientific
enterprise. See id.
197. See Luce, supra note 64, at 697. In Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984), plaintiff's estate brought an action alleging the patient was placed
on life support without her consent or consent of the family. See id. at 1053. The com-
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The FDA apparently is attempting to borrow from the equipoise
concept first introduced by Charles Fried. According to Fried, only
when a doctor can view all arms of a clinical trial as equally promising should he or she proceed with the research.' However, insisting
upon a state of pure theoretical equipoise would make most experiments unethical because, invariably, physicians have an educated
hunch going into a trial that one treatment is superior. To avoid
these difficulties, Benjamin Freedman introduced the concept of
"clinical equipoise."1 According to this view, for the investigation to

be ethical, a sufficient state of medical uncertainty should exist within
the clinical community and the research itself should be designed so
that the experiment will make a difference in resolving the medical issues.2W0
The FDA would be better off sticking more closely to Freedman's clinical equipoise concept. It is not enough that uncertainty
exists and a "reasonable minority" of medical professionals believe
that a better treatment is available.01 The trial must be demonstrated
as capable of providing generalizable, acceptable answers. This is an
essential criterion that should be satisfied before enrolling patients in
such trials without prospective consent-that at least a subject's participation will have mattered so that the specific costs of the state of
medical uncertainty will likely not have to be imposed again.
Allowing waiver of informed consent for trials that are not rigidly designed leads to the reduction in value of any information
generated by the study. One need not be overly statistical or fastidiplaint also alleged that she received experimental drugs while on life support. See id at
1054. The court noted the potential for abuse in assuming that consent to treatment will
be implied as a matter of law during a medical emergency and pointed out that physicians
could wait until potentially uncooperative patients become critical and then administer
the treatment, realizing that consent will be implied in those situations. See id. at 1053.
Indeed, some critical care researchers enrolled patients in experimental resuscitation
trials under deferred consent protocols and faced the difficult situation of having to tell
the family members about the experiment after the fact when it turned out that the patient was not resuscitated successfully. Apparently, several IRBs concluded that
approaching the families and explaining the complexities of the critical care research
were too difficult and did not require that the researchers follow-up with discussions with
family members. See Norman S. Abramson, Informed Consent for ClinicalResuscitation
Research, 20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1251,1252 (1991).
19& See CHARLES FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION:

PERSONAL INTEGRITY

AND SOCIALPOLICY 51

(1974).
199. Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics of ClinicalResearch, 31 NEW ENG.

J. MED. 141, 141 (1987).

200. See id.
at 144 (arguing that research is ethical where a state of uncertainty exists
among the entire clinical community such "that the results of the successful clinical trial
should be convincing enough to resolve the dispute among clinicians").
201. See id.
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ous to recognize that the risk of bad science creates -an equal risk of
bad ethics. Unless there is strict insistence that waiver of informed
consent will occur only if the Freedman state of clinical equipoise
exists, patients could be exposed to unexamined risks or to studies
that fail to advance significantly the confidence level in choosing
therapies for their particular conditions.
Consider what happened with the testing of the Alzheimer's
drug Cognex (tacrine). An FDA expert panel voted against releasing
Cognex based on inconclusive results from clinical studies. 202 Then,
the same FDA committee was requested to consider releasing the
drug for limited use. Part of the problem arose in the design of the
initial two hundred patient study, which featured a controversial
"crossover" provision. All patients first received the drug and only
those who showed benefit were allowed to proceed to the next phase,
where randomization took place between Cognex and a placebo.m
Cognex tested better, but researchers later wondered whether this
was due to the control group suffering from the comnon problem of
the "withdrawal effect," where patients coming off a drug experience
faster deterioration. At the time, researchers expressed concern that
the poor initial study data left them ill-equipped to compare other
Alzheimer's drugs coming to market because Cognex's effects were
not understood well enough to be used as a control.04
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that waiver of informed consent is permissible only if the trial is a rigorously
controlled one with randomization and double-blinding. As Fried
has rightly observed, the difference between a controlled trial and a
observational study is not between scientific truth and falsehood, but
between varying degrees of confidence.20 The question then becomes whether the costs imposed by that extra degree of confidence
are worth it. In most critical care research, the costs seem justified.
The stronger the basis for the research results, the better the information that can be transmitted. This aids both sides of the researchersubject relationship. "The quality of evidence obtained in randomized controlled trials allows physicians and patients to make rational
202. See Michael Waldholz, FDA May Release Drug for Alzheimer's, WALL ST. J.,
July 15, 1991, at B1.
203. See id.
204. See iL

205. See FRIED,supra note 198, at 159 ("It is ironical indeed that those who, in arguing
for RCTs [randomized controlled trials], say we must purge ourselves of absolutionist
thinking regarding the rights of individual patients; engage in absolutist thinking themselves regarding the superiority of randomization.").
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decisions about treatment. Real freedom of choice in therapy derives
from evidence that permits an informed choice. ' 2 When informed
consent is waived, it will always remain uncertain that proceeding
with the research was in accord with the critical care patient's preferences. Accordingly, among the additional safeguards needed, apart
from attempts to predict or presume the patient's choice, is special
scrutiny of the soundness of the research proposal. There should be
assurances that the design of the trial meets acceptable statistical criteria so that the data generated is capable of resolving the dispute
among most medical professionals.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Determining the proper scope of informed consent standards for
critical care research requires the resolution of difficult and often
conflicting legal and ethical concerns. No easy, quick-fix solution is
apparent. Thus, the best approach attempts some sort of practical
compromise, one that balances decision-making authority between
researchers, patients, and their families, and furthers, as much as possible, the objectives of the traditional informed consent doctrine,
while removing unnecessary legal barriers to important research.
The law of informed consent in the non-experimental context has
evolved case by case to harmonize autonomy concerns with competing societal interests, such as with the recognition of the emergency
exception. But the applicable law has largely been silent regarding
the special circumstances of critical care research. A flexible legal
framework for consent in the critical care context needs to be developed. This final section recommends three possible approaches for
improving the applicable legal standards.
A. Broaden the Time-Window and Reasonsfor Allowing Waiver
The proposed FDA rules represent a significant start in the right
direction by allowing waiver of informed consent requirements under
limited circumstances.w However, the rules should allow waiver of
informed consent where the patient is not in immediate danger of
loss of life. The proposed rules are underinclusive in that they exclude a potential class of subjects who are unable to provide consent
but who face serious risk of death, disability, and/or pain. The in206. John A. Oates & Alastair J. Wood, The Regulation of Discovery and Drug Development, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 311,312 (1989).
207. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086,49,093
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21, 1995).
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formed consent standards need to recognize the realities of medical
practice, where it is difficult to make meaningful distinctions between
imminent life-threatening situations and other critical care episodes.
All such situations impose terrible consequences on patients and
their families and warrant a more flexible approach in establishing
consent.
The FDA standards enabling IRBs to approve waiver of informed consent should be expressly revised to allow waiver where
intervention is necessitated because of a situation that is lifethreatening, severely disabling, or reasonably certain to cause enduring or intractable pain. In addition, the regulations should make
clear that a critical care condition is not subject to any particular
time-window for the onset of death. Rather the standard should be
that waiver of informed consent be allowed when: (1) death due to
the condition is reasonably medically certain, and (2) there is credible
medical evidence to suggest that the probability of death or severe or
painful deficit resulting from the experimental therapy is not greater
than that arising from the standard treatment.
B. Increased Use of SurrogateConsent Mechanisms
Complementary to the reforms proposed by the FDA, regulatory and legislative change is needed to increase use of surrogate
consent procedures. Rather than immediately bypassing the consent
process altogether, as proposed in the FDA rules, researchers in critical care situations should first be required, if feasible, to consult a
standardized hierarchy of representatives who will act for a patient
lacking decisional capacity or the ability to communicate. The surrogates should be directed to make the research participation decisions
using a substituted judgment standard, approximating what they
think the patient would want.28 Only if such clearly authorized surrogates are not readily available should the research be allowed to
proceed by waiving informed consent, assuming that other applicable
criteria have been met.
1. Respect for Autonomy
Increased use of surrogate consent procedures represents an attempt to accommodate more seriously the concerns of personal
autonomy in the critical care research context. To the extent that the
208. Of course, if the patient has executed an advance directive that applies to the
critical care research situation, the advance directive should be followed and there would
be no need to consult a surrogate.
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objective of the informed consent doctrine is to promote selfdetermination, this goal can be furthered short of requiring in all instances that the patient prospectively provide consent. As discussed
above, giving effect to patient preferences through surrogate consent,
where otherwise the patient would be unable to do so, is a means of
respecting patient autonomy and personal dignity. Surrogate consent
ensures that there is at least some consideration of the research activity in light of the patient's preferences, to the extent they are
known. In this respect, because truly informed prospective consent
cannot be obtained, surrogate consent comes as close as possible to
ascertaining patient preferences and represents the best way of
maximizing autonomy in the situation, while avoiding halting the research altogether.2f
IRBs will need to be vigilant to ensure that readily accessible
procedures for invoking surrogate consent to critical care research do
not have the unintended effect of reducing efforts by investigators to
educate patients about research protocols and determine the patients' preferences. Physicians may make less of an effort to discuss
these topics with, for example, patients in early stages of Alzheimer's,
if they know that a surrogate who may be "easier" to talk to will be
appointed during the later stages of the disease.
2. Easily Identifiable and Available Surrogates
The need for legislation or regulations that clearly identify the
list of available surrogates cannot be overemphasized. The current
confusion under many state laws as to who can provide consent has
led to a deplorable situation of ignorance and deliberate evasion of
the law by certain institutions.
If the surrogate list is wellpublicized, patients will know what to expect should they become incapacitated and may even be encouraged to discuss their preferences
with their applicable surrogates. The more the surrogate consent
process becomes understood and standardized, the more likely it is
that unwilling subjects will express concerns about experimentation
prospectively and that researchers will be able to contact potential
surrogates during limited time windows. Legislation and/or regulations making clear the class of potential surrogates would counter the
tendency to make critical care research participation decisions clan209. See Morton Cohen, The Emergency Exception to Informed Consent: Does it Extend to Human Experimentation?,20 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 1260,1264-65 (1991).

210. See, e.g., Prentice et al., supra note 12, at 5-6 (describing IRB approval of a study

at the University of Nebraska Medical Center that directly violated Nebraska law limiting
the ability of surrogates to provide consent).
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destinely.
The FDA rules are deficient in this respect because they fail to
answer clearly who is a legally authorized representative and do not
indicate how to resolve disputes among family members regarding
disenrollment. To avoid these problems, authorizing statutes and
regulations should make plain the relative decision-making priority
of available surrogates, both with respect to enrollment and disenrolment decisions.
The class of available surrogates could include spouses, parents,
children, siblings, guardians, other relatives, and close personal
friends. The exact group of authorized surrogates and their relative
decision-making priority are, of course, subject to reasonable debate.
However, it is important, given that many critical care patients are
older patients, that the class of available surrogates include the adult
children of patients.2 '
3. Preference for Family Member Surrogates
Family members in particular should be authorized and encouraged to act as surrogates. In the standard clinical setting, many
physicians follow the common practice of sharing medical information with close family members caring for the patient when the
patient is incompetent. This seems appropriate because the family
members must live with the consequences of any medical treatment
decisions and may have the best understanding of the patient's preferences.
Indeed, some courts have stated that the physician's
fiduciary obligation to provide informed consent extends to providing
this information to family members when the patient is incompetent.2 1 Arguably, a logical corollary to this obligation is that the
211. See, eg., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1 to 40/55 (West 1991). The Illinois Health
Care Surrogate Act provides a useful model. The law establishes a hierarchy of potential
surrogates who may decide to terminate life-sustaining treatment on behalf of patients

who lack decisional capacity and who suffer from a terminal condition, permanent unconsciousness, or an incurable or irreversible condition. The class of authorized surrogates
and their order of decision-making priority are as follows: (1) the patient's guardian of
the person; (2) the patient's spouse; (3) any adult child of the patient; (4) either parent of
the patient; (5) any adult brother or sister of the patient, (6) any adult grandchild of the

patient, (7) a close friend of the patient; and (8) the patient's guardian of the estate. See
id. at 40125.
212. Cf BEAUCHAMP & CHMLDREsS, supra note 110, at 179-80 (recognizing the historical role of parents as surrogate decision-makers for their children).
213. See, eg., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). In
Leach, the court reinstated the cause of action of an estate alleging that a woman was
placed on life support without her family's consent. See id at 1054. The court concluded

that "when a patient becomes incompetent, the physician's fiduciary obligations of full
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family members provided such information should be able to act accordingly and give surrogate consent on the patient's behalf.
The family's role has been recognized by various courts as important to the medical decision-making process because: (1) the
family has a general concern for the patient; (2) the family is most
likely to be cognizant of patient preferences; and (3) the family relationship depends on privacy and autonomy and there should be as
little interference from the state as possible in medical decisionmaking when such issues are not easily answered by society as a
whole.2' Also, affording family members a high priority in the decision-making process is consistent with the fact that the family often
will have the continuing legal duty for the patient's maintenance and
support.215 In general, the family has to live with and feel the immediate effects of the experimentation decision, such as whether the
investigational therapy will increase the chance that the patient
lapses into an irreversible coma.216 Moreover, the family is less likely
to treat the subject as an object or a symbol for a cause. Finally,
family members are more likely to be available than other persons
during critical care situations.
There are acknowledged dangers in affording family members a
high priority in surrogate decision-making. An adult patient's wishes
may differ from her family members. 7 Moreover, family members
may have conflicts of interest when deciding on investigational
treatment for critical care patients. An experimental trial that offers
uncertain benefits and may prolong the patient's disabling condition
can impose terrible emotional and financial burdens on family members.21 In addition, even if family members are capable of being
located during the limited time window for providing consent, they
may be suffering from emotional distress and incapable of making a
disclosure flow to the person acting in the patient's behalf." Id.
214. See Krasik, supra note 81, at 555. Indeed, some jurisdictions have recognized
next of kin as having a constitutionally protected property interest in the patient's remains. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that

wife's interest in husband's remains included the right to consent to removal of the corneas).
215. See Krasik, supra note 81, at 556.

216. See Hamman,supra note 169, at 162.
217. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 867 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986). In Kowalski, the father of a physically and mentally impaired woman was ap-

pointed, over the objections of the woman's female lover, as guardian for purposes of
deciding medical treatment. See id.
at 863. The court granted the father sole discretion in
determining visitation rights, regardless of the daughter's previously expressed prefer-

ences. See id at 867-68.
218. See Moore, supra note 7, at 566.
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fully informed decision on the patient's behalf.219
Certain of these dangers can be guarded against by requiring
that surrogate consent forms and researcher-initiated surrogate consent requests expressly remind surrogates of their obligations to use
substituted judgment. Also, the authority of surrogates appointed
through default mechanisms could be more limited than the authority
of surrogates appointed formally through the making of a health care
proxy. For example, the former could consent only to research involving certain risk thresholds but the latter could consent to a
broader range of experimental treatments. Similarly, surrogates appointed through default mechanisms should not be allowed to
consent for a subject's participation -in nontherapeutic research2 0 In
addition, it is hoped that to the extent surrogate consent procedures
are more readily available and understood, patients will be encouraged to make their preferences known by either informing their
potential surrogates or executing advanced directives. Ultimately, the
preference for family members derives most support from patient
autonomy concerns. Independent research advocates and/or IRB
committee members are simply not as likely to know the treatment
preferences of individual patients, especially critical care patients
with whom they may have had no prior contact. Once decisionmaking authority is given to someone other than the patient, it makes
most sense to transfer this authority to persons most likely to be able
to decide as the patient would have wanted?22'
4. Additional Level of Review
Requiring investigators to seek the consent of a surrogate when
219. See Abramson et al., supra note 96, at 2829. Clearly, competent patients in similar situations also face considerable stress and their capacity to provide informed consent
can also be questioned. The vulnerability and desperation of critically ill people presents
difficulty in acknowledging the legitimacy of their choices. However, to discount decisions made under such conditions is to suggest that these decisions can only be made in a
vacuum, which undervalues and diminishes the immediate experiences and perceptions of

the patient. See Moore, supranote 7, at 566.
220. Of course, distinguishing in advance between nontherapeutic and therapeutic
research may make sense in theory but is not always possible in practice. See MUNSON,
supra note 16, at 339-41. Some research involves the withholding of accepted medical
treatment perceived as beneficial but which, after further research, is proven harmful.
For example, research into the occurrence of premature blindness in infants, which involved the withholding of standard oxygen tent treatment, revealed that infants kept in
the pure oxygen environment were more likely to be blinded. See id. at 342.
221. But see Ezekiel Emanuel & Linda Emanuel, Proxy Decision Making For Incompetent Patients, 267 JAMA 2067, 2070 (1992) (suggesting that family members'
independent decisions regarding termination of care must be "restricted and supervised"
(citations omitted)).
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feasible also encourages additional scrutiny of the research plan by
the investigator, forcing physicians to examine again the relative
benefits and costs of the activity by having to explain the experiment
to outside parties. This process can encourage more rational decision-making and weed out research of uncertain design that poses
impermissible risks. m In addition, surrogate consent helps to avoid
appearances of fraud or duress. Designating an additional party from
whom the researcher must attempt to obtain consent serves as a
check on institutional bias and addresses concerns that IRB members
will be too passive in challenging research of questionable design
when the protocols are developed by influential members of the institution's faculty. Thus, requiring that researchers seek surrogate
consent if possible offers the limited procedural protection of inserting an additional party and level of review, apart from the monitoring
performed by the IRB, into the subject recruitment process.
5. Consistent with Current Legal Trends
Regarding Right to Die
Legislation and rulemaking authorizing increased use of surrogates to consent for critical care research would not represent a
dramatic departure from the current legal framework in light of the
increasing trend acknowledging the right of incompetent patients to
exercise decision-making through surrogates in the non-experimental
setting. Ironically, several states already allow surrogates to make
health care decisions with even more drastic consequences than participation in critical care research, such as the decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment. It makes little sense to give a surrogate the
right to make life or death determinations, but to deny the surrogate
a role in apparently less momentous decisions, especially when the
decision to participate in critical care research may amount to
choosing between the chance of life and reasonably certain death.
The basic legal justification for surrogate decision-making in the
right-to-die context is that the incompetent person must still be able
to assert the common-law right to self-determination and/or the constitutional right to privacy even if unable to sense a violation of it.2
222. See King & Henderson, supra note 62, at 1028 (emphasizing the need for physicians to fully consider and clearly communicate the potential risks to the patient).
223. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492 (Cal. App. 1983)

(discussing the legitimacy of a surrogate's decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
when there is little chance of the patient recovering cognitive or motor functions); In re
Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375-76 (Wash. 1984) (noting that Washington law allowing a
guardian to choose whether to terminate or continue life support is not absolute, but is
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Courts have allowed surrogates to make decisions usinag a substituted
judgment standard, reasoning that incompetent persons have the
same rights as competent individuals to refuse medical care "because
the value of human dignity extends to both."22 4
Admittedly, special factors and considerations present in the
context of withdrawing life-sustaining treatment do not apply with
the same force to critical care research. The societal concern for respecting the wishes of persons to die with dignity and the particularly
emotionally charged decisions involving refusal of life-sustaining
treatment indicate that much more is at stake in ight-to-die cases
than in the critical care research setting. The decision to participate
in a medical experiment does not implicate as directly these same
fundamental questions. Thus, use of surrogates may, ironically, be
more palatable in deciding to withdraw life-sustaining treatment because of the desire to protect the patient's right to privacy with
special vigilance and the inclination to help the dying effectuate their
intent when they are unable to do so themselves. Nevertheless, the
decision to participate in a medical experiment merits at least comparably proportionate protection through use of surrogate consent
mechanisms. Because many prospective critical care subjects are in
situations where they will likely die or suffer under conventional
treatment, participation in an experiment offers the opportunity to
fight for life or at least to strive for a better quality of life. Such a decision represents the expression of core personal values just as does
the invocation of one's right to die with dignity.
Indeed, the constitutional cases recognizing a liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment have also clearly recognized that the Due
Process Clause protects an interest in life. Accordingly, surrogate
consent procedures for critical care research are consistent with the
right to refuse medical treatment. Such a right means giving the patient the chance to "evaluate the potential benefit of treatment and
its possible consequences according to one's own values and to make
a personal decision whether to subject oneself to the intrusion."' 26
Whether the treatment is investigational or involves withdrawing life
limited to directives from a patient of sound mind).
224. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427

(Mass. 1977).
225. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)
(noting that the State has an interest in safeguarding the personal life or death decision

and must impose a heightened evidentiary standard in order to ensure that any decision is
made in full view of the specific circumstances and with complete consideration of the

State's interest in preserving life).
226. Id. at 309 (Brennan, 3., dissenting).
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support, surrogate consent attempts to respect the incompetent patient's right to make critical medical decisions by approximating as
best as possible the patient's choice under the circumstances.
6. Reconsenting/Inaccuracy of Surrogates
Surrogate consent poses many of the same problems as deferred
consent. The "reconsenting" procedures required if the patient regains decisional capacity may be challenged rightly as empty,
ritualistic mechanisms. At the time of reconsenting, the patient has
already been used as a subject. Because even under surrogate consent the patient's preferences can never be truly known, requiring the
participation of the decisionally incapacitated means risking injury to
their autonomy for the benefit of others. An after-the-fact reconsenting cannot alter the character of the subject's initial
participation.227
A more troubling problem of increased use of surrogate consent
mechanisms is the danger that surrogates will substitute their own
interests for the patient's. As already noted, family members may
have conflicts of interest when acting as surrogates. Equally problematic is that even when acting with the best of intentions,
surrogates may simply not be accurate predictors of what the patient
wanted because of the inherent subjectivity of the factors and judgments involved. Relying upon intuitive, subjective decision-making
by surrogate family members makes judicial reviewability of such decisions nearly impossible and thus offers little protection to patients
who do not have idealized "selfless, loving families" to rely upon.228
Studies indicate that surrogates, even close family members, often do
not adequately understand the preferences of the patients for whom
they are acting.2'
227. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 94-95 (regarding reconsent as being
extracted rather than freely given).
228. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L.
REv. 1519, 1650 (1991).

229. One such study revealed that surrogate decision-makers who were family members were poor predictors of resuscitation preferences of elderly clinic outpatients, even
though the patients themselves thought that their family members would accurately represent their wishes. See Allison Seckler et al., Substituted Judgment: How Accurate Are
Proxy Predictions?,115 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 92, 94-95 (1991). The family decision-makers achieved statistically significant concordance with patients' preferences but
did not achieve moderate strength of agreement; meanwhile, physicians acting as surrogate decision-makers did no better than chance alone in predicting the preferences of
patients. See id. at 95-96; see also Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 221, at 2069
(reviewing studies showing highly significant discrepancies between patients and proxies

in quality of life assessments).
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Many subjects in critical care research situations are older patients who tend to be more cautious about research participation.
Yet it is often younger family members that are called upon to make
the decision. 3" These inherent tendencies for inaccurate decisions
may be compounded in the critical care research context. The surrogate is being asked to evaluate what the patient would have wanted.
However, it is not clear whether this decision should be made from
the perspective of the patient lefore the critical care episode or at the
time of the illness. A patient's world view can change dramatically
with the onset of sudden illness so that previously discussed treatment preferences with proxy surrogates or otherwise publicly known
preferences are not necessarily an indication of how the patient views
the situation when undergoing the trauma. Strokes, heart attacks,
and other severe and sudden medical episodes can produce enormous
anxiety and the unexpected nature of the condition produces emotional harm separate from the underlying medical injury. 31
It is admitted that surrogate decisions are not and will not be as
accurate in practice as promised in theory. Nonetheless, most patients would probably be more comfortable knowing that decisions
whether to participate in experimental treatment at a critical time in
their lives will, when feasible, be made by family or friends in consultation with physicians, rather than face categorical exclusion from
such opportunities or letting the decision be made by an IRB committee or through a protracted guardianship proceeding that
promises no better prediction of the patient's preferences. 2 Because
the patient will experience most directly the burdens and benefits of
the research activity, the patient's interests and preferences, even an
imperfect approximation through surrogate consent procedures,
should be controlling.2 33
Consistent with the new pragmatic trend in bioethics and health
law to reject principle-driven, deductive analysis in favor of evaluat-

230. See Sachs & Cassel, supra note 147, at 236.
231. See Theodore A. Stem, PsychiatricManagement of Acute Myocardial Infarction
in the Coronary Care Unit, 60 AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 59J, 61J-66J (Dec. 28, 1987)
(discussing the importance of recognizing and treating psychiatric complications of patients with heart disease).

232. Cf. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,451 (NJ. 1987) (noting that for decisions involving
withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, "[ec]ourts are not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal problems that underlie these cases [and o]ur legal system
cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by the patient, those caring
for the patient, and those who care about the patient").
233. See Shultz, supra note 60, at 220.
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ing legal rules by how well they function in medical practice, a more
flexible and pragmatic approach is needed to apply informed consent
requirements to the critical care research setting. The admitted
problems with accuracy and conflicts of interest surrounding surrogate consent suggest that lowered expectations are required about
what proxy consent can accomplish. Surrogate consent procedures
should not be viewed as entirely satisfactory mechanisms for accommodating the ethical and legal problems associated with critical care
research. A surrogate consent approach represents a default procedure that attempts to discern patient preferences as best as possible
under difficult circumstances. Certainly, more empirical analysis is
needed to test the validity of surrogate consent procedures in the research setting. The conventional rationale that the surrogate can
properly act on behalf of the incompetent patient may need to be reevaluated. At the very least, the law may need to further
contextualize surrogate consent procedures, recognizing those instances where the surrogate is likely to replicate the patient's
preferred choice and limiting surrogate consent when this is not feasible.
C. EstablishingEndpoints and Use of Expert Surrogates
Even if legislative and regulatory reforms make surrogate consent procedures more readily available, some critical care research
studies will still involve extremely limited time windows under which
obtaining consent from any surrogate remains impossible. On such
occasions, where researchers intend to forego any form of consent,
additional safeguards are needed to ensure that patients are not exposed to unnecessary risks or encouraged to pursue likely futile
treatments. The FDA rules are deficient in this respect in that they
establish too lax a standard of "clinical equipoise" for guiding IRBs
in determining whether the risks of the experiment and the state of
medical uncertainty warrant waiver of consent.
IRBs should be charged with documenting and providing more
clear assurances that the research risks are acceptable. If informed
consent cannot function in critical care research as in other settings,
IRBs must fill in the gap and take additional steps to protect the
safety and dignity of experimental subjects. IRBs must bear strict
responsibility for ensuring that the research design is sufficiently
234. See generally Wolf, supra note 109 (suggesting that a paradigm shift is occurring
in bioethics and health law towards a pragmatic philosophy embedded in empiricist investigation and concern for the particular context).
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promising and presents an acceptable risk of harm to be even considered for employing surrogate consent mechanisms and/or waiving
consent. Offering patients, or their surrogates, desperate choices in
times of crisis that present unreasonable risks does not advance patient autonomy and harms the research endeavor generally2 s
Some commentators have recommended the creation of special
advocates, independent of the academic institutions in which the research is to be conducted, to function as monitors of the acceptability
of proposed research risks in light of the critical care patient's preferences.236 However, despite the label, having a special person
designated "patient advocate" is no better a guarantee that the patient's interests and preferences will be represented than allowing
researchers to consult a readily known hierarchy of surrogates composed of family members and friends. Patient advocates will have no
previous knowledge of cardiac arrest victims and accident victims
admitted to the hospital in a diminished state. And in the limited
time window permitted for application of experimental treatment, it
is not clear that patient advocates will be available with any greater
frequency than a patient's family and friends. Finally, establishing
procedures for the appointment of special advocates represents a far
too cumbersome and administratively complicated approach for the
limited benefits gained.
A better alternative for addressing these concerns is to establish
a mechanism that scrutinizes the proposed critical care research protocol rigorously to ensure that the combination of expected risks and
benefits of applying the experimental therapy, in light of current
medical knowledge, are equal or better than the standard treatment.
Where there is not sufficient time to consult a surrogate or other legal representative, experimentation should be permitted to proceed
by waiving consent only if the research protocol has been approved
by an IRB committee that has specifically considered the merits of
the research risks in light of the inclusion of subjects with diminished
autonomy.
IRBs should be required to consider not only how subjects are
selected and the degree of risks to which they will likely be exposed,
but also what are the endpoints for the experiment. The research
protocol should establish mandatory and timely stages for review of
the study results by parties not directly involved in the day-to-day
235. See King & Henderson, supra note 62, at 1048-49.
236. See, e.g., Philip M. Bein, Surrogate Consent and the Incompetent Experimental
Subject, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 739,761-62 (1991).
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investigation2 37 This would permit rapid termination of the study in
the event of unforeseen risks. In addition, establishing timely review
of the research progress would ensure that the study is conducted no
longer than necessary to obtain generally acceptable results.
In addition, it is recommended that waiver of informed consent
occur only if the IRB monitoring and approving the research has
sought the judgment of experts in the particular medical field applicable to the experiment' 2 8 Under this "expert surrogate" approach,
IRBs send out surveys asking experts in the field whether they would
be prepared to enter a proposed trial as a patient-subject, and
whether they would enter the trial if it involved randomization of
treatment, use of a placebo, etc. The acceptability of a study to expert surrogates would be useful to IRBs (as well as potential subjects
and their surrogates) when faced with difficult research and waiver of
consent requests. When the expert surrogate mechanism has been
employed, individual physicians and patients who saw no problems
with entering a proposed trial indicated they wanted to change their
minds once given the results of surveys showing a majority of expert
surrogates would not consent.239
Expert surrogate surveys thus impart important information to
IRBs about the acceptability of the proposed research risks. These
surveys are able to combine the theoretical expertise of investigators
(who may not be impartial) and the theoretical impartiality of IRBs
(which, despite their physician members, may not have sufficient expertise in the area under investigation). Of course, there is the
danger that use of expert surrogate mechanisms will inevitably result
in truly insightful researchers being slowed down in their research
endeavors until their peers recognize their advances. But when IRBs
are faced with especially difficult issues, such as waiving informed
consent, expert surrogate surveys would prove useful. They would
relieve IRBs of some of the difficulties in directly challenging individual investigators on questions of research design. Expert
surrogate surveys would also complement and supplement the proposed FDA requirement that IRBs consult with representatives of

237. See Problems in Securing Informed Consent, supra note 11, at 124 (testimony of

Arthur L. Caplan, Director, Center for Bioethics, University of Pennsylvania).
23& See William J. MacKillop et al., The Expert Surrogate System: A Role for the
Golden Rule in Clinical Practice,4 HUMANE MED. 89, 90 (1988) (proposing an expert
surrogate system for monitoring clinical trials).

239. See id (involving participation in clinical trials studying treatments for non.smallcell lung cancer).
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the communities from which critical care subjects will be drawn. 240
Evidence of how the research community views the proposed experiment will no doubt affect how the local community will view the
experiment. Also important, expert surrogate surveys can counter
the possibilities of institutional and/or experimental bias, which may
arise when IRBs depend on risk assessments of investigators who are
too closely associated and involved with the research protocol.
Demonstrating the acceptability of the research design to expert
surrogates also ensures that an individual trial will be capable of generating meaningful clinical answers. Expert surrogates should be
asked not only whether the research poses acceptable risks to warrant their participation, but also whether it will be capable of
providing experimental data that will resolve pressing therapeutic
disputes in the field. The study should not be approved unless a reasonable number of the expert surrogates agree that it can provide
meaningful evidence on whether a significant difference exists between the experimental and standard therapies.
These are the additional minimum criteria, apart from the standards established in the proposed FDA rules, that should be insisted
upon by each IRB before approving research employing waiver of
informed consent. The state of medical uncertainty imposes its own
terrible costs upon the critical care patient. These burdens should
not have to be experienced in the future by the subject and other
critical care patients. Patients and their families should at least know
that the patient's participation will have made a meaningful difference.

240. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,100-01
(1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Sept. 21, 1995).

